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FOREWORD
The energy environment today and a view of what is likely to be
the environment in the mid eighties and nineties is most important to
timely policy development and wise R&D activities. Just as the United
States was not prepared for the sharp reduction in energy supply and
increase in cost occurring in 1973, it may find that it is ill prepared
for the 1990'x. In order to understand what may be the long-range
energy environment, it is necessary to assess how the 1980's may differ
from the 1970's as to energy supply pressures and yet how the 1990's
might once again bring an increase in energy problems, but with reduced
energy substitution and conservation options. The energy trend for the
future is a very comprehensive question and many studies have been
conducted to provide guidance. Thus, it was the purpose of this study
team to expose for consideration possibly important differences in
parameters to be faced in the 1990's vs. the 1980's vs. the 1970'x.
Such differences and their associated energy environments may provide
road signs for a wise energy policy and supportive technology develop-
ment. 1h erefore, the reader should review this document with an under-
standing that it was the study team's purpose to provide thoughtful
speculation with supportive logic to expose important considerations
for long-range planning rather than limiting speculations to minor
extrapolation of historical data. We encourage readers to analyze the
overall assumptions and rationale and relate the reported findings to
long-range R&D concerns.
Bobby G. Batten
NASA Study Manager
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ENERGY ENVI1O*ZNT STUDY
By
Raymond Strangways'and Usman Qureshi2
EXECUTIVE SMARY
Introduction
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of the interna-
tional demand for and supply of oil between the years 1980 and 2000.
it also includes estimates of future world oil prices and their impli-
cations the price of jet fuel. Specifically, three critical ques-tions
are investigated: (1) Sow long will the world supply of oil continue
to keep pace with its demand under likely trends in its use and dis-
covery? (2) At what price will demand and supply clear the world oil
market? (3) What does the analysis imply about the price of jet fuel?
Previous energy studies have projected supply and demand based upon an
arbitrarily assumed price of oil. The present study follows the re-
verse procedure, which is more consistent with microeconomic analysis,
provides a more logical and fruitful approach to answer the questions
raised above. First, we project the demand for and supply of oil.
Second, we put the two together to draw price implications for crude
oil. Finally, we examine implications for the price of jet fuel.
On the demand side, two principal factors affecting the world
demand for oil over the next two decades are identified: these are (1)
GNP growth rates and (2) petroleum conservation and conversion meas-
ures. On the supply side, six principal factors are isolated as being
crucial for projecting the world supply of oil: (1) the magnitude of
proven reserves, (2) net additions to proven reserves, (3) the minimum
ratio of reserves to production, (4) rate of oil production that
'Professor, Department of Economics, Old Dominion University,
Norfolk, Virginia 23508
2 Professor and Chairperson, Department of Economics, Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508
exporting countries permit, (S) net imports from the communist coun-
tries, and (6) synthetic fuel production. For each of these eight
factors affecting world supply and demand, three projections consisting
of low, medium, and high values are presented. The three demand pro-
jections could be combined with the three supply projections to con-
struct a total of nine supply-demand scenarios for projecting petroleum
prices. Of these, only three scenarios are examined for price implica-
tions. The first scenario is the combination of the medium demand and
medium supply to obtain a 21dlevel scenario. This is the scenario
which the authors judge most likely to occur. The second scenario
combines low demand and low supply to provide a low-level scenario, and
the third joins high demand and high supply to obtain a high-level
scenario. The second and third scenarios are judged possible, but con-
siderably less likely. The three scenarios are then analyzed and the
price of petroleum is projected for 1990 and 2000 for each scenario.
Finally, the relationship between the price of petroleum and the price
of jet fuel in the United States is examined, and jet fuel prices are
projected for 1990 and 2000 for each scenario.
Petroleum Demand
One of the major determinants of the world demand for oil is GNP
growth rate. The reason is that petroleum is an input into the pro-
duction of goods and services along with labor, capital, and other
resources. An increase in output produced requires an increase in all
inputs including petroleum. Thus growth in the demand for petroleum
depends on the growth of GNP. To estimate growth in the demand for
oil, economic growth rates are projected for medium, high, and low
demand scenarios for the decades of the eighties and the nineties.
For WOCA (World Outside Communist Areas) an average annual GNP
growth rate of four percent is projected for the medium-demand scenario
which we judge most likely to occur. Average annual GNP growth rates
of five and three percent are projected for the high and low scenarios,
respectively. For areas included in WOCA, average annual GNP growth
2
rates vary from 2 percent for the low scenario for the hhaited states to
6.5 percent for the high scenario for Japan, and 4.8 percent for the
medium scenario for Canada. These rates are then used as an input to
project the demand for petroleum in WOCA for 1990 and 2000 for each
scenario.
The other major factor impacting the world demand for petroleum is
the level of conservation in tha use of oil and the rate of conversioa
to other sources of energy. OPEC prices quadrupled between 1973 and
1974 and have more than doubled since 1976. Thew price increases, as
well as regulations by national governments aimed at reducing oil con-
sumption, account for most of the conservation and conversion efforts
in WOCA.
in the residential /comercial sector, substantial savings in the
use of fuel oil are being realized by increased insulation, improved
building designs, and efficiency in the use of oil for space hoot. Tt
is estimated that these conservation measures will enhance fuel effi-
ciency by as much as 40 percent by the year 2000 in WOCA. Since 1979
there has been an increasing trend toward conversion from oil beat to
natural gas and electricity in the residential/commercial sector in the
United States. This trend is apparent in both the steady decline in
new homes installing oil heat and the rate at which oil heating systems
in existing structures are being converted to natural gas and electric-
ity. We project such a conversion to take place over the next 30 years.
The low-conversion scenario (high demand for oil) assumes a straight
line depreciation of existing fuel oil furnaces. Other scenarios as-
sume more rapid conversion to other energy sources.
The electric utility sector in the ihited States and the rest of
WOCA is subject to mandatory governmental regulations aimed at convert-
ing oil- and gas-fired burners to coal-fired power plants and nuclear
generating facilities. Tn the United States the Power Plant and Tndus-
trial Fuel Use Act of 1978 prohibits the use of oil or natural gas in
new electric utility generation plants or in new industrial boilers	 i
with a fuel heat input rate of 100 million Btu's per hour or greater.
3
rSimilar realations prohibiting the use of oil-fired burners in genera-
ting electricity were in effect in WOCA long before their introduction
in the United States. The conversion of oil-fired burners to coal-
fired plants is projected to take place over the next 20 years under
low, medium, and high conversion scenarios. The analysis applies to
r	 both the United States and WOCA.
We define the manufacturing sector as consisting of all those
industrial activities in which interfuel substitution is readily feasi-
ble. In these activities conversion to other fuels is projected to
take place over the next 20 years at varying rates, thereby affecting
the demand for oil.
The other industrial sector includes those productive activities
in which potential for interfuel substitution is limited. Due to the
peculiar character of the production processes in agriculture, cover
struction, mining, and chemical feedstocks, which uniquely favor the
use of oil, the prospect for interfuel substitution is highly limited.
Oil consumption in this sector is directly related to the level of
output which, in turn, depends on economic growth rates Therefore, we
have estimated the demand for petroleum in this industrial sector by
taking into account the various assumed economic growth rates for WOCA.
The transportation sector in the United States is a major consumer
of petroleum and promises great potential for conservation and fuel
efficiency improvements. A primary reason for this lies in the man-
dated fuel economy improvements for domestic automobiles and in the
growing emphasis on other modes of transportation, including mass tran-
sit. High gasoline prices have induced changes in driving habits and
increased demand for now fuel-efficient cars. Conservation in the use
of fuel by automobiles is further reinforced by a switch to diesel-
powered vehicles which are more efficient than the gasoline-powered
automobiles. There is also a growing emphasis on electric and hybrid
vehicles in the United States. However, the extent of their market
penetration in the near term depends heavily on the rate of battery
development and goverw,.ant incentives for commercialization. These
developments have been incorporated in demand projections made by
several private and government organizations in recent years. One of
4
these, that of the Presidential Studli Commissions form the basis for
projecting the transportation demand for patrols= in the U.S. for this
study.
In the rest of WOCA, the outlook for petroleum demand in transpor-
tation is quite different from that in the United States. Many coun-
tries already use mass transit system and drive smaller fuel efficient
automobiles. These countries will not be able to achieve improvsmsoto
in efficiency comparable to that projected for the United States.
Therefore, for the rest of WOCA we project an increase in the demand
for patrols= in the transportation sector for 1990 and 2000 in propor-
tion to the economic growth rates for each area and scenario.
Petroleum Supply
Analysis of the factors determining the supply of petroleum begins
with proven reserves, which are oil estimated to be economically at-
tractive to produce under current conditions from fields where oil
content has been confirmed by drilling and testing. Gross additions to
proven reserves result each year from genuine now discoveries, revised
estimates of previously discovered fields, and improved recovery tech-
niques. it is not possible to say what proportim of gross addi:ior
over the next two decades will come from each of the three sources
stated above. Early in the period most will no doubt be from now dis-
coveries and reassessments. As we get closer to the year 2000, rela-
tively more will come from enhanced recovery as the technological prob-
lems are gradually overcome. In constructing our supply scenarios, we
evolve a rationale assuming gross additions to proven reserves in WOCA
of 15 billion barrels per year. The low-supply scenario assumes gross
additions of 12 billion, and the higb-supply scenario assumes 1S bil-
lion barrels annually. In all three scenarios two-thirds of gross
additions are assumed to be in the non-OPEC are" and one-third within
OPEC.
Over the next 20 years. the limited availability of proven re-
serves will limit annual production in much of WOCA. The technology of
oil extraction is such that it takes an average of 15 years to exploit
i
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a newly discovered field, including the time necessary to develop the
required infrastructure. Thus, for countries with relatively limited
reserves, their annual volume of output may be increased only with an
expansion of proven reserves. For countries with vast reserves, as in
the Middle East, annual output will probably be determined by economic
and political aspects rather than by technical limiations. For all
three supply scenarios, we assume that the R/P ratio for the non-OPEC
areas of WOCA remains at 15/1.
In seven OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Libya, proven oil reserves are so vast
and R/P ratios so high that the availability of reserves does not pre-
sent a relevant technical limit to oil production at the present time.
Although we do not consider the R/P ratio to be the relevant factor
constraining total OPEC oil production for the period under considera-
tion, we do believe that OPEC nations will establish production limits
below the level that is technically feasible. Several arguments are
presented to support this conclusion. First, six OPEC countries, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Qater, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Libya, have
extensive balance-of-trade surpluses. Despite a substantial increase
in imports, their balance-of-trade surplus increased rapidly, and, in
the final quarter of 1979, was running at an annual rate of 104.5
billion. This is an excessive amount to be absorbed or to be invested
abroad. Political opposition to sizable direct foreign investment and
low yields on financial assets make oil in the ground a competitive
alternative to expanded production. For our most likely scenario, we
project that OPEC nations will limit production to 36 MBOD (million
barrels of oil per day).
Soviet oil production is projected to peak in 1985 and decline
moderately before stabilizing. oil consumption will likely follow the
economic growth rate. The residual which is available for export will
gradually decline and become zerc sometime between 1983 and 1992.
Communist China is not expected to increase oil exports at an
extremely rapid rate. Exports will be increased only as needed to
provide foreign exchange to support economic growth. Chinese exports
will roughly offset the loss of Soviet oil to the free world.
6
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Synfuels are liquids and gases readily substituted for convention-
al oil and natural gas in most applications. They can be derived from
oil shale, coal, heavy oil, tar sands and agricultural products. How-
ever, many barriers relating to technology, excessive costs, large
investments, and environmental problems must be overcome before syn-
thetic fuels can make a significant contribution to energy supplies.
Although there is virtually no synthetic fuel production in the world
today, the technological base for such an industry already exists. The
world price of crude oil has risen to a level that makes oil shale and
tar sands economically attractive and liquification of coal marginal.
Production of synthetic liquid fuels by 1990 will be minimal, but may
reach a level of 8 14BOD by the year 2000.
Supply-Demand Interaction and Price Projections
The extent to which the OPEC countries are expected to increase
the price of petroleum over the coming years depends on the market
conditions of demand, non-OPEC supply, and willingness of the OPEC
countries to restrict production. Consequently, we bring together the
separate demand and supply projections to examine the price implica-
tions. We conclude that the price of petroleum will rise during the
1980'x, though at a more moderate rate compared to the 1970',.
It is hypothesized that prices of kerosene products will closely
follow the price of crude. An econometric model is developed to meas-
ure more precisely the relationship between the price of crude and the
price of jet fuel. 'fie regression results obtained are statistically
significant, and are used to project the price of jet fuel. Price
projections for crude oil and jet fuel are shown in tables A and B.
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be derived from this
I
entire study is that the petroleum market will tighten substantially in
the 1990's. This will occur in all three scenarios and in spite of the
marked increase in synfuel production that we have projected. The
reason for the tighter market is that the process of conservation and
conversion will have been substantially completed and into its final
7
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Table A. Crude petroleum real-price projections for
1990 and 2000 (in 1980 dollars per barrel).
SCENARIO
LOW DEMAND-	 MIDLEVEL
	
HIGH DEMAND-
ff1
	 YEAR	 LOW SUPPLY	 HIGH SUPPLY
	
980	 $ 35	 $ 35	 $ 35
	1990	 $ 43	 $ 52	 $ 63
	
2000	 $ 77	 $102	 $150a
a projected price for 1999 immediately preceding a
projected shortfall
9
Table B. Projected price of jet fuel in the United States
in 1980 prices (dollars per gallon).
SCENARIO
LOW DEMAND- MIDLEVEL HIGH DEMAND-
YEAR LOW SUPPLY HIGH SUPPLY
1980 $ 0.92 $ 0.92 $ 0.92
1990 $ 1.11 $ 1.32 $ 1.57
2000 $ 1.89 $ 2.46 $ 3.56a
aEstimate for 1999 preceding a projected shortfall in
2000.
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INTRODUCTION
The production of petroleum in the United States peaked in 1970
and has since declined substantially. The price of a barrel of crude
quadrupled between 1973 and 1974, resulting in sharp increases in the
Consumer Price Index and the deepest recession in the history of the
United States since the 1930's. It is evident that by the 1990's the
world's conventional oil resources will be seriously depleted.
The nature of the energy problem is twofold. First, the popula-
tion of the world has been growing rapidly for the last several centu-
ries, escalating sharply during the twentieth century. Second, the
Gross National Products (GNPs) of many nations have been growing stead-
ily. For example, the GNP of the United States has been growing at an
average annual rate of slightly over four percent for a century (refs.
1, 2). Analogously, there have been high GNP growth rates for the
economies of Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Canada, and Japan. Just
as a growing population requires energy to support it, so does growing
economic activity. The industrial countries have not abandoned their
pursuit of sustained economic growth, nor have the developing countries
relinquished their expectations for catching up with rich nations in
higher standards of living. However, there are not enough petroleum
reserves to sustain indefinitely the production levels of both indus-
trial and developing countries.
Petroleum resources are concentrated in a few nations. Proven
U.S. reserves of petroleum peaked at 47 billion barrels in 1970 and
then declined to the present level of 28 billion barrels. This oc-
curred  in spite of the one-shot addition of 10 billion barrels from
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in 1970. In the 1950's the U.S. found 1.25
barrels of oil for every barrel extracted fror the ground, but by the
late 1970'a this dropped to about 0.5 barrel. Lately the reserves in
the United States have been declining by 1.25 billion barrels a year.
Just to maintain the current production would require a discovery rate
50 percent higher than tnat of the last 10 years.
Recent discoveries in the North Sea have added 25 billion barrels
of reserves, but the United Kingdom is expected to be a net importer
11
within a decade. Petroleum resources on the Arabian Peninsula are so
plentiful that the cost of producing a barrel is less than two dollars, 	 I
but even this resource is finite. Furthermore, OPEC countries are
expected to maintain ceilings on production and may supply only a small
proportion of the total world demand.
The era of cheap and plentiful petroleum is coming to an end and
world demand for petroleum will soon be pressing the available supply.
We will never again have as much oil or gas as we have today, nor will
it be as cheap. The solutions are voluntary conservation and rapid
development of alternative sources of energy, especially synthetic
a
fuels.	 f
In this study three critical questions are explored: (1) How long	 !
will the production of oil continue to keep pace with demand under
likely trends in its use and discovery? (2) At what price will it be
available? And (3) what does this analysis imply about the price of
jet fuel?
12
STUDY PLAN
Most energy studies in recent years* have begun by assuming a
future world price for petroleum, then proceeded to project supply and
demand implied by the assumed price. This procedure is based on the
obvious fact that both future demand and supply depend in great measure
on the price in the market. However, at this juncture we believe that
the reverse procedure is more fruitful. Increases in the price of
petroleum in the 1970'x, particularly following the near doubling in
1979 to 1980, have set off changes in both demand and supply that ara
not likely to be reversed under any forseeable price developments.
Therefore, in this study we first project demand for petroleum, then
the supply of petroleum. We then put the two together to draw price
implications for crude oil and, finally, for jet fuel.
Two principal factors are isolated as being particularly crucial
for projecting the Free World demand for oil over the next two decades:
(1) GNP growth rates and (2) conservation and conversion measures.
Six principal factors are isolated as being particularly crucial
for projecting the supply of oil: (1) the magnitude of proven re-
serves, (2) net additions to proven reserves, (3) the minimum ratio of
reserves to production, (4) the rate of oil production that exporting
countries permit, (S) net imports from the Communist countries, and (6)
synfuel production.
Each of these eight factors is analyzed one at a time. For each
one the typical procedure is, first, a theoretical analysis of why and
how this factor can be expected to affect either the demand for or sup-
ply of petroleum and, second, examination of some historical or empir-
ical data concerning this factor. Third, on the basis of steps (1) and
(2) we make specific assumptions regarding quantitative values which
this variable may take on over the coming two decades. This step
clearly is conjectural and requires considerable exercise of judgment.
*Most notably the path-breaking study performed by the Workshop on
Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES) (see refs. 3-6)
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Different observers may make different judgments and reach different
conclusions. However, we believe that this procedure makes clear and
explicit just where assumptions must be made and what our assumptions
are.
To account for the fact that reasonable people may have different
judgments, assumptions are made for each of three possibilities. The
first possibility is the medium or mid value. This value is the
authors' judgment regarding what is most likely to happen to this spe-
cific factor during the 1980's and 90 1 s. The second possibility is a
low-demand or low-supply value. This is the authors' judgment regard-
ing a low value which mig`-at be possible but is unlikely to occur. The
third possibility is a high-demand or high-supply value which might be
possible but is unlikely to occur.
To summarize, for each of eight factors affecting supply and de-
mand, three values are presented for low, medium, and high possibili-
ties. The three demand projections could be combined with the three
supply projections to construct a total of nine supply-demand scenarios
for projecting petroleum prices. We have chosen to examine only three
scenarios for price implications. First is the combination of the
medium demand and medium supply to give a midlevel scenario. This is
the scenario which thr^ authors judge most likely to occur. The second
scenario joins low demand and low supply, and the third joins high
demand and high supply. These two scenarios are judged possible but
considerably less likely. They jointly provide upper and lower bounds
to projections for the two decades. These three scenarios are then
analyzed and the price of petroleum is projected for 1990 and 2000 for
each scenario. Finally, the relationship between the price of petro-
leum and the price of jet fuel in the United States is examined, and
jet fuel prices are projected for 1990 and 2000 for each scenario.
i
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DEMAND ANALYSIS
Introduction
Two principal factors affecting the Free World demand for oil are
(1) GNP growth rates and (2) conservation and conversion. These fac-
tors are discussed in detail in the subsections which follow.
Economic Growth Rates
Theoretical Analysis
The world demand for petroleum depends on world real GNP, and the
growth in petroleum demand depends on GNP growth. The reason for this
is quite simple. Petroleum is an input into the production of material
goods and services along with labor, capital, and other resources. M
increase in production requires an increase in the usage of all inputs,
including petroleum. Thus, growth in the demand for petroleum depends
first on the growth of GNP.
However, GNP growth rates are subject to fluctuations due to the
occurrence of business cycles. Business cycles interrupt the process
of sustained economic growth, setting off changes in the growth of real
output and, consequently, in the demand for oil. The economic history
of the last 150 years organizes itself so easily into a series of 3- to
10-year cycles that the reality and existence of business cycles be-
comes unmistakably obvious.
Economic growth and business cycles are closely intertwined.
During the expansion phase of the cycle they reinforce each other, and
income, output, and economic activity in general increase at a noticea-
bly faster rate. Then, during the ensuing contraction phase, they
oppose one another and business activity slows, or perhaps even falls,
for a period of time. The continued occurrence of business cycles over
the next 20 years can be confidently predicted; however, the length of
specific expansions or contractions cannot be predicted at all. For
example, it is impossible today to forecast whether the year 1990 will
be a year of expansion or a year of contraction. Therefore, no attempt
15
is made in this study to predict business cycle fluctuations or their
impact on the demand for petroleum.
In projecting economic growth rates in this study, it is assumed
that steady rates of economic growth will not be interrupted by the
occurrence of business cycles. Thus, the economic growth rates pro-
jected here are long-tern trends representing the growth process and
not a specific growth rate for each year. This approach is adopted so
that the influence of business cycles on economic growth is minimized
and long-run trends can be projected.
Historical Data
Table 1 shows the GNP growth rates for the World Outside the Com-
munist Areas (WOCA), industrial nations such as the United States,
Canada, and Japan, and a number of selected regions, i.e., Europe, the
Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Australia. The data are pre-
sented for 1960-70, 1968-77, and 1973-77. Deese three periods were
chosen because of the wide range of economic conditions that existed in
each period.
The decade of the sixties was a period of comparatively favorable
economic conditions and rapid growth in output. Real GNP in WOCA in-
creased at an average annual rate of 5.2 percent in the sixties.
During most of this period, the United States experienced rapid eco-
nomic expansion with very little or no inflation.
The Consumer Price Index began to rise in 1967 and peaked in 1969
with seven percent annual inflation. Only 1960 and 1970 were years of
economic contractions, and these were relatively mild. Western Europe,
Japan, and Canada also enjoyed steady economic growth during the six-
ties with virtually no inflation in West Germany, Switzerland, Denmark,
and Japan. All in all, WOCA and other areas included in the sample
experienced high rates of GNP growth ranging from 4.3 percent for the
United States to 10.5 percent for Japan as illustrated in column 1 of
table 1.
On the contrary, the 1973-77 period was marked with economic un-
certainty and cyclical depression. The United States, Western Europe,
16
Table 1. Historical GNP growth rates (annual percentage change).
PERIODS
F 
WOCA
USA
Canada
Europe (Exc. Tui key)
Japan
Middle East(Inc. Turkey)
Latin America
Africa
Asia (Exc. Japan)
Australasia
World
Developed Market Economies
Developing Market Economies
Communist Countries
1960 - 70
HIGH GROWTH
(X)
5.2
4.3
5.6
4.7
10.5
7.9
5.5
5.4
4.8
5.3
4.7
4.1
5.6
6.7
1968 - 77
MEDIUM GROWTH
(X)
4.0
2.6
4.8
3.5
6.7
8.5
6.5
5.2
4.9
3.9
4.3
3.5
6.3
6.2
1973 - 77
LOW GROWTH
(X)
2.7
2.0
3.4
1.8
3.2
5.9
4.8
4.9
5.3
2.9
2.8
2.2
5.3
5.3
Source: ref. 7
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and Japan experienced the worst recession since the Great Depression
of the thirties. Unemployment in the United States reached the level
of nine percent simultaneously with double digit inflation. Oil prices
quadrupled in 1973. resulting in serious cutbacks in production levels
of the industrial nations and disruption of their economies. World
peace was threatened by a war in the Middle Bast and the oil embargo of
1
the United States. Under these disruptive conditions, economic growth
rates fell substantially to 2 percent in the United States and 1.8
`	
percent in Europe. In Japan, the growth rate was a mere 3.2 percent,
I and only 5.3 percent in the developing economies. Overall, WOCA
achieved a 2.7 percent growth rate in spite of these unfavorable con-
ditions.
GNP growth rates for 1968-77 (shown in table 1, column 2) reflect
performance of the economies during a combined period of'sconosic ex-
pansion and contraction. Data are based on two years of rapid economic
growth offset by two years of severe recession with five years of mod-
i
*rate GNP increases. GNP growth rates varied from a low of 2 .6 percent
for the United State to a high of 8.5 percent for the Middle East with
WOCA averaging 4.0 percent. Because %he 1968-77 period includes both
the peals and troughs of the business cycle, combined with a five-year
period of sustained economic growth, this period should serve as a more
realistic norm for making future GNP growth projections.
Scenario Assumptions
Recently the earlier optimistic estimates of real GNP growth for
the market economies have been revised by more pessimistic projections
for the future. Both government and private studies predict moderate
economic growth rates through the decades of the eighties and nineties.
While it is bali^aved that the market economies included in WOCA could
grow somewhat slowly, exceptionally low GNP growth rates over two dec-
ades do not appear probable nor acceptable by governments in the indus-
trial or developing nations. Low GNP growth rates contribute to high
unemployment and have potentially disruptive economic and political
effects, especially for the developing nations. Iherefore, whereas it
is difficult to project accurately the real GNP growth rate for the
period 1980-2000. it is quite reasonable to assume that national
18
r governments would do all they could to achieve an economic growth rate
consistent with high employment. 'Phis would require an average annual
GNP growth rate of four percent. We believe that WOCA can and will
achieve this rate, and therefore project an average annual GNP growth
rate of four percent for the decades of the eighties and nineties for
our medium demand scenario, which we believe is the most likely to
	
i	 occur. This four percent average for WOCA is consistent with a law of
three percent for the United States and a high of six percent for the
	
r	
developing economies. GNP growth rates for other subdivisions of WOCA
for the medium-demand scenario are shown in column 2 of table 2.
Alternatively, a relatively high annual GNP growth rate of five
percent may be achieved in WOCA if the favorable conditions of the
sixties are repeated. Therefore, we project a high rate of economic
growth of five percent for WOCA for the decades of the eighties and the
nineties. Because petroleum is an essential input to all production
processes, a GNP growth rate of five percent would be associated with a
high world demand for oil. Growth rates for individual areas within
WOCA for the high-demand scenario are given in column 3 of table 2.
Conversely, WOCA may realise a relatively slower annual rate of
GNP growth for the decades of the eighties and the nineties. A steady
increase in the world price of petroleum may force the industrial na-
tions to cut back production, slowing down economic growth rates.
Assuming that the above conditions prevail, we project a slower rate of
GNP growth of three percent per year for WOCA for the decades of the
eighties and nineties, contributing to a smaller world demand for
petroleum. Low-demand scenario growth rates for subdivisions of WOCA
are given in column 1 of table 2.
Conservation and Conversion
The term "conservation" as applied to energy has a variety of
meanings which are often confused. Some possible meanings include the
following: (a) doing without, i.e., reduced consumption of goods and
services which require energy input and a resulting reduction in real
income; (b) changing the composition of consumption in favor of those
19
Table 2. Projected GNP growth rates: 1980 - 2000
(annual percentage change).
LOW-DEMAND MEDIUM-DEMAND HIGH-DEMAND
AREA SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
WOCA 3.0 4.0 5.0
USA 2.0 3.0 4.0
Canada 3.4 4.8 5.6
Europe (Exc. Turkey) 2.2 3.5 4.7
Japan 3.5 4.5 6.5
Developing Economies 5.3 6.0 6.4
Australasia and South 2.9 3.9 5.3
Africa
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goods requiring less energy input and whose relative prices have
fallen; (c) changing the choice of production technique to use less of
the energy input whose relative cost has risen, and (d) innovation,
i.e., the setting up of a new low-cost production technique requiring
less of the higher priced energy input.
Political discussions of the need to conserve energy generally
assume definition (a), i.e., doing without. Conversely, in this study
the definitions for conservation and conversion of petroleum are in-
tended to exclude (a) and to include meanings (b), (c), and (d). The
activities implied by this usage are primarily willful choices by con-
sumers and producers in response to changing relative prices and moti-
vated by self-interest.
In addition to these willful choices, consumers and producers
throughout WOCA have been constrained by governmental decrees dictating
changes in both consumption and production to reduce the use of petro-
leum. Conservation and conversion are used here to include these dic-
tated actions to reduce petroleum consumption.
Conservation and conversion activities have already been initiated
throughout WOCA which will have dramatic impacts on the demand for
petroleum. These impacts will vary widely among the various sectors of
the economy, depending primarily on the extent to which conversion to
other fuel sources is feasible. To examine these forces in detail, the
economy is divided into five sectors: residential/commercial, electric
utilities, manufacturing, transportation, and the nonmanufacturing
component of the industrial sector. Demand projections are made for
each of these sectors for six subareas of WOCA and totaled to estimate
the demand for oil in WOCA for the 1980's and the 1990'x.
Residential/Commercial Sector
Theoretical and empirical analysis. - In recent years, conserva-
tion in the use of oil for heating residential and commercial struc-
tures has been accelerated throughout WOCA due to OPEC price increases
and government regulations aimed at reducing demand. Conversion to
other sources of energy, such as natural gas, electricity, and solar
21
}energy, has enhanced conservation efforts. Substantial savings in the
consumption of oil are being realised by increased insulation, caulk-
{	 ing, and weather stripping in new and existing dwellings, by introduc-
tion of heat pumps, and by conversion to other sources of space heat.
In Europe and Japan greater emphasis on improved building designs and
efficiency in use of fuel oil for heat have added potentials for
reduced oil consumption in the residential and commercial sector.
According to the WAES Study (ref. 3), conservation measures in WOCA are
expected to improve fuel effic r,cncy by as much as 40 percent by the
year 2000.
Currently, there are about 15 million residential and commercial
oil heat customers in the United States, comprising 20 percent of the
total energy market for this sector. More than 55 percent use natural
gas; approximately 15 percent heat with electricity; and the rest use
bottled gas, wood, coal, kerosene, and solar heat. Oil heat is domi-
nant in the northeast United States and New England where the cost of
heating has escalated sharply since 1976.
Since 1979, there has been a significant trend toward conservation
in the use of oil in the residential and commercial sector of the
United States. The trend is increasingly apparent in the steady de-
cline in the number of new homes installing oil heat. The percentage
of newly constructed homes equipped with fuel oil furnaces dropped to 6
percent in the second quarter of 1979 from 11 percent in 1976 (ref. 8).
Surveys indicate that most homes in the Washington, D.C., Maryland, and
New Jersey areas are constructed near gas lines. Real estate agencies
claim that homes equipped with natural gas heating systems sell quick-
er. With oil heat in the declining stage of its life cycle, there is
significant empirical evidence to support the argument that by 1985 no
newly constructed single and multiple family dwellings will be equipped
with oil furnaces.
Other significant evidence of conservation in the usage of oil in
the United States is the rate at which the oil heating systems in the
existing residential commercial structures are being converted to natu-
ral gas and electricity. The American Gas Association estimates that
approximately 765,000 homeowners have converted to natural gas since
22
who presently use oil for space heat will convert to other sour
late 1978, and many more are in the process of doing so or are expected
to do so in the near future. There is persuasive argument for conver-
sion to natural gas which remains abundant in supply and is cheaper
than oil. Price deregulation under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
has encouraged production. Since the Act was passed, gas prices have
risen only 38 percent with the average gas bill only $60 higher in the
winter of 1980 over the 1979 season (ref. 9). On the other hand, the
real price of oil is expected to continue to rise over the current
decade. Prices of natural gas will increase also, but such price in-
creases are not expected to catch up with oil prices. Therefore, gas
heat is by far a cheaper choice for the 1980's and will continue to
provide a strong incentive to consumers for conversion from , oil heat.
Of course, the major impetus towards both conversion and conserve- 	 i
tion efforts in the residential and commercial sector has been provided
by rapid price increases of No. 2 heating oil relative to price in-
creases of natural gas and electricity. As figures in table 3 indi-
cate, prices of No. 2 heat'.ng oil, natural gas, and electricity in-
creased by roughly the same proportion through 1978. However, the
doubling of oil prices in 1979-80 following the Iranian Revolution sud-
denly changed the relative price structure. From 1976 to March 1980,
the price of No. 2 heating oil increased 139 percent while natural gas
was up 94 percent, and electricity only 37 percent. This marked the
beginning of the dramatic shift away from oil for heating in the
residential/commercial sector--a trend which is not likely to be re-
versed.
Scenario assumptions. - We believe that in the residential/commer-
cial sector conversion from oil heat to other sources of space heat
will take place over the next 30-year period. Such conversion may
occur under any one of the following three assumed scenArins.
Beginning with 1980, under the low-conversion scenario (high
demand for oil), a straight line depreciation is assumed with the
replacement of oil heat furnaces by other systems only as the existing
equipment wears out. Under this assumption, in 1990, as illustrated in
figure 1, 27 percent of all those residential and commercial customers
Table 3. Average energy prices to residential customers in the United
States.	 i
NO. 2 HEATING OIL NATURAL GAS ELECTRICITY
YEAR (cent/gal) (cent/1000 ft3 ) (cent/kWh)
1976 40.6 184.6 3.09
1977 46.0 226.4 3.42
1978 49.4 262.6 3.69
1979 65.6 323.1 3.97
March 80 97.0 357.9 4.24
a
i
INDICES
1976 100 100 100
1977 113 123 111
1978 122 142 119
1979 162 175 128
March 80 239 194 137
Source: ref. 10
24
o	 .
/
ao
o
a+
^ o ^
^	 ^o o d
,	 / N
W V 3Z
co
41
ON
M
0% o
w
• CA co
O1/ ♦ O
Ch u
/	 I
Go y
/	 ♦ u
C
/ ♦ CO
CL
N
sw
d
/^^ Coo/ 4) o
Af N
a41
DO
d
O
ao
^
0^0
O coO ^O uO1 m	 N
C
''
IMM33ridu 33VNTU 3!)VZNaouaa
25
heat while 73 percent will continue to utilize fuel oil systems. In
the year 2000, the percentage of those converted to other sources of
heat is assumed to increase to 53 percent with 47 percent of consumers
still heating their dwellings with oil furnaces. By the year 2010,
about 80 percent of the current oil heat customers are assumed to
switch over to other sources of heat with 20 percent still utilizing
oil as a means for space heat.
This straight line depreciation and replacement of equipment over
30 years seems to be the minimum rate of conversion that could be rea-
sonably expected. It is considerably more likely that conversion to
other fuel sources will take place more rapidly than assumed in the
low-conversion scenario. In response to the relative price changes
that have already occurred, it is expected that more than 50 percent of
the present oil heat equipment would be replaced in the first half of
the depreciation period, with the conversion rate tapering off in the
second half of the period.
Thus, under the average conversion scenario (medium demand for
oil), the assumed replacement rate is that which is considered most
likely to occur. Again, beginning with 1980, as illustrated in figure
1, it is assumed that of those residential and commercial customers who
presently heat with oil furnaces, 37 percent will convert to alternate
systems by 1990, their percentage eventually increasing to 66 percent
in the year 2000 and to 85 percent in 2010. Consequently, 63 percent
of the oil heat customers in the residential and commercial sector will
continue to utilize fuel oil as a primary source of space heat in 1990
with the percentage decreasing to 34 and 15 percent in 2000 and 2010,
respectively.
While it is most likely that conversion will take place at a pace
comparable to that assumed in the average conversion scenario, it is
possible that conversion may take place more rapidly. This possibility
is covered by the high-conversion scenario. Under the high-conversion
scenario (low demand for oil), a high replacement rate of fuel oil fur-
paces is assumed. It is assumed that in 1990 approximately 47 percent
of current oil heat customers will switch over to alternate systems
with the number eventually rising to 77 percent in the year 2000 and to
26
90 percent in the year 2010. Customers who continue to use fuel oil as
a source of space heat are assumed to be 53 percent, 23 percent and 10
percent of their 1980 level in the years 1990, 2000, and 2010, respec-
tively, as illustrated in figure 1.
Demand Projections. - Implications of the scenario assumptions for
the United States are detailed in table 4. Under the low conversion
the number of oil heat customers will decline from 15 million in 1980
to 11 million in 1990. This represents a reduction in the demand for
oil from 3.40 million barrels per day (MBOD) to 2.50 MBOD. By the year
2000, the number of customers is expected to decline to 7.1 million,
resulting in a consequent reduction in the demand for oil to 1.61 MBOD.
By the year 2010, the number of oil heat customers is expected to de-
crease to 3.0 million with the demand for oil eventually diminishing to
0.69 MBOD.
Under the average-conversion scenario, the number of oil heat
customers is projected to decline from the 1980 level of 15 million to
9.5 million in 1990 with a decline in the demand for oil from 3.40 MBOD
in 1980 to 2.10 MBOD in 1990. For the year 2000, the number of cus-
tomers is estimated to decline to 5.1 million with the demand for oil
shrinking to 1.10 MBOD. Analogously, the figures for the year 2010 are
estimated at 2.3 million oil heat customers with the demand for oil at
0.52 MBOD.
Under the high-conversion scenario it is projected that the number
of oil heat customers in the United States will decline from 15 million
in 1980 to 8 million in 1990. This will reduce the total market demand
for oil to 1.8 MBOD in 1990 from 3.40 MBOD in 1980. For the years 2000
and 2010, the number of oil heat customers is estimated at 3.5 and 1.5
million, respectively. This is expected to reduce the demand for oil
from 3.40 MBOD in 1980 to 0.80 MBOD in 1990 and 0.35 MBOD in 2010.
Because the same international prices of crude petroleum are faced
by all industrial nations and because rational economic consumers any-
where in the world respond to price increases by cutting back consump-
tion, identical conversion rates for fuel oil furnaces and similar
conservation efforts are applied to the residential/commercial sector
E
t
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for oil in the residential/commercial sector
ates.
NO.	 CUMULATIVE	 AMOUNT OF
CUSTOMERS	 PERCENT	 OIL
(in millions)	 DECLINE	 UTILIZED
(MBOD)
	
15.0	 --	 3.40
Low Conversion/
High Demand	 1990	 11.0	 27	 2.50
2000	 7.1	 53	 1.61
2010	 3.0	 80	 0.69
Average Conversion/
Medium Demand	 1990	 9.5	 37	 2.16
2000	 5.1	 66	 1.16
2010	 2.3	 85	 0.52
High Conversion/
Low Demand	 1990	 8.0	 47	 1.81
2000	 3.5	 77	 0.80
2010	 1.5	 90	 0.35
Table 4. Projected demand
of the United St.
TIME
SCENARIO	 PERIOD
Historical	 1980
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in WOCA as in the United States. Table S presents data reflecting the
demand for oil in the residential/commercial sectors of a number of
selected areas and WOCA. Demand projections are made for these areas
for the years 1990 and 2000 by using low, average, and high conversion
rates previously discussed and portrayed in figure 1. These data are
then utilized in projecting the total demand for oil in WOCA for 1990
and 2000 for the residential/commercial sector.
In summary, fuel oil consumption in the residential/commercial
sector of WM is quite sensitive to higher prices. High oil bills are
expected to encourage conservation by discouraging installation of fuel
oil furnaces in new single and multi family dwellings, by encouraging
conversion from oil heat to natural gas and electricity in existing
structures, and by enhancing iaproved insulation and efficient building
designs. The conversion of fuel oil facilities to other modes of space
heat is projected to take place over the 30-year period as the existing
i
equipment wears out or may proceed at the average or higher rate of
conversion. Conservation in the use of fuel oil in the residential/com-
mercial sector of WOCA is expected to lower the fuel input per unit of
output produced and, consequently, reduce the demand for oil.
Electric Utility Sector
Theoretical and empricial analysis. - Beginning with World War II
until 1973, the demand for electricity in the United States increased
at an average annual rate of seven percent while the average price per
kilowatt hour (kWh) paid by users decreased (ref. 11). The quadrupling
of oil prices in 1974 and the subsequent rise in coal prices produced a
sharp break in these trends. By 1977 the annual growth rate in the
demand for electricity declined to 4.2 percent and subsequently to 3.7
percent in succeeding years. In 1973 the average price per kWh of
electricity paid by residential and industrial customers was 3.4 and
1.7 cents, respectively. By 1977 prices were up to 4.1 and 2.5 cents
per kWh. Further price increases in the ensuing years reflected higher
fuel costs, increased construction costs, and environmental control
costs.
In the United States, oil and natural gas account for the major
29
Table S. Projected demand for oil in the residential/c , o rcial
sectors of WOCA (million barrels of oil per day).
i
t
E
° LOW DEMAND MEDIUM DEMAND HIGH DEMAND
AREAS SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
1
1990 2000 1990 2_ 0`00 1990 2000
WOCA 5.00 2.22 5.96 3.26 6.90 4.45
USA 1.81 0.80 2.16 1.16 2.50 1.61
Canada 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.40 0.26
Europe (Exc. Turkey) 1.77 0.79 2.11 1.17 2.44 1.57
Japan 0.33 0.15 0.40 0.22 0.46 0.30
Developing Economies 0.75 0.33 0.89 0.49 1.03 0.66
Australasia and South 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05
Africa
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fuel usage in the generation of electricity. On November 9, 1978, in
an all-out effort to reduce the demand for oil in the electric utility
sector, President Carter signed five major bills into law that consti-
tute the National Energy Act (NEA). Four of the Acts have significant
implications for the electric utility sector. These focus especially
on fuel conservation, adjustment of pricing policies, and reduction in
the demand for oil due to interfuel substitution.
Most important for our purposes here is the Power Plant and Indus-
trial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (ref. 12). This Act prohibits, with certain
exceptions, the use of oil or natural gas in new electric utility
generation facilities or in new industrial boilers with a fuel input
rate of 100 million Btu's per hour or greater. It also prohibits, with
minor exceptions, the use of natural gas by existing power plants after
January 1, 1990. The Act further empowers the Department of Energy to
	
i
issue orders requiring specific electric-generating facilities to con-
vert from oil to coal. Exemptions may be granted if a facility cannot
be converted or if doing so would increase costs. The overall effect 	 i
of the Act is to increase the share of electricity generated by coal
and to reduce the share generated by oil and natural gas.
In addition to this legislative imperative, there is some economic
reason to convert from oil to coal. In November 1978, the cost per Btu
from residual fuel oil was almost double that from coal. One year
later, oil was almost triple the cost of coal (see table 6). Thus,
operating costs are considerably lower for coal than for oil, particu-
larly since the oil price increase following the Iranian Revolution.
Although the price of coal will no doubt rise due to the increasing
demand, it is almost certain that this disparity in cost between oil
and coal will widen even further in coming years.
Tma principal impediment to immediate conversion of all existing
oil-fired boilers is the high capital cost of coal- fired boilers. A
typical oil or natural gas boiler costs between $300.000 and $500,000
and can be installed in 30 to 60 days. A comparable coal boiler costs
about $9,000,000 and takes 3 to 4 years for installation.* With
*Data provided by Mr. Ed Peters of the Department of Energy.
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Table 6. Cost of fossil fuels to electric utilities in the United
States.
DATE
November 1978
November 1979
COST ( per million Stu)
RESIDUAL
	
COAT.	 FEL OIL
	
$1.16	 $2.26
	
$1.28	 $3.67
RATIO OF OIL TO COAL
1.9
2.9
Source: ref. 8
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interest rates at historical levels, this cost difference is highly
significant in delaying conversions.
A second impediment to the installation of coal-fired boilers is
the environmental protection problem. The smallest electrostatic pre-
cipitator costs about $1.5 million, and a great deal of time is requir-
ed to produce environmental impact studies and obtain all the necessary
approvals.
Finally, there are sole existing oil plants that simply cannot be
cone :ed to coal. A good deal of space is required for storage and
handling of coal, and some oil facilities just do not have the rquired
space to convert.
in conclusion, there are both legal and economic reasons to con-
vert oil-fired electric-generating plants to coal or other energy
sources. At the aria time there are legal, economic, and physical
impediments to conversion. Therefore, ve cannot expect conversion in
the electric utility sector to be either complete or rapid.
Scenario assumptions and demand projections. - With ever-
increas-ing emphasis on conservation of oil in the electric utility sector, we
believe that the process of conversion of oil-fired burners to alterna-
tive energy sources will take place over the next 20 years under one of
the following 3 scenarios (see fig. 2 and table 7). Under the low-
conversion scenario it is projected that the demand for oil in the
electric utility sector will decline to 1.5 MOOD in 1990 from 1.7 MOO
in 1980. This represents a 15 percent reduction in consumption. By
the year 2000, the demand for oil is projected :o decline 40 percent to
1.0 MSOD. This demand for oil will be forthcoming from those utilities
which will continue to utilize oil-fired burners in 1990 and 2000.
Under the average-conversion scenario it is estimated that the
demand for oil will decline to 1.2 MOOD in 1990 from a total of 1.7
MD in 1980 due to higher conversion rates of oil-fired burners. TM s
represents a 33 percent decrease in the mount of oil consumed. by the
year 2000 the demand for oil is projected to decline to 0.8 MOD. in-	 I
dicating a SS percent reduction in the amount of oil consumed.
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Table 7. Projected demand for oil in the electric utility sector of
the United States.
TIME CUMULATIVE OIL UTILIZED
SCENARIO PERIOD DECLINE (X) (MBOD)
Historical 1980 1.7
Low Conversion/ 1990 15 1.5
High Demand
2000 40 1.1
Average Conversion/ 1990 33 1.2
Medium Demand
2000 55 0.8
High Conversion/ 1990 50 0.9
Low Demand
2000 70 0.5
c
i
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1
The high-conversion scenario projects a much faster rate of con-
version of oil-fired burners to other power plants. It is projected
that electric utilities will consume 50 percent less oil and cut back
demand to 0.9 MBOD by 1990. Reduction in the demand for oil is esti-
mated to be 70'percent in the year 2000 compared with the 1980 level.
This means a decline from 1.7 MBOD in 1980 to 0.5 MBOD in the year
2000.
The rationale presented above can be extended to WOCA, where
mandatory government regulations aimed at converting oil-fired burners
to coal-fired power plants and to nuclear-generating capabalities were
in existence long before these regulations were introduced in the
United States. The reason is that the Western European industrial
nations and Japan are more heavily dependent on imported oil than is
a	 the United States. Also, if approval and construction time aspects are
controlled effectively, nuclear generation is a more economical means
of producing electricity which not only keeps the cost at a minimum but
also contributes substantially to the conservation of oil in the elec-
tric utility sector. For these reasons, identical conversion rates of
oil-fired burners are applied to electric utility sectors in WOCA as in
the United States. Table 8 presents data reflecting the demand for oil
in the electric utility sectors for six selected areas as well as WOCA.
Oil demand projections are estimated for these areas for the years 1990
and 2000 under the assumed low, medium, and high demand scenarios.
These data are then aggregated to project the total demand for oil in
WOCA for 1990 and 2000.
In summary, the demand for oil in the electric utility sectors is
subject to mandatory conservation enforced by the national governments.
Conversion of oil-fired burners to coal-fired burners is projected to
take place over the next 20-year period under the low, average, and
high conversion scenarios. Such conversion is expected to reduce the
demand for oil in the electric utility sector over the coming two dec-
ades.
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Table 8. Projected demand for oil'in the electric utility sectors of
WOCA (million barrels of oil per day).
LOW-DEMAND MEDIUM-DEMAND HIGH-DEMAND
AREAS SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
WOCA 2.91 1.75 3.93 2.63 4.95 3.50
USA 0.78 0.47 1.06 0.71 1.33 0.94
Canada 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
Europe (Exc. Turkey) 0.4± v.56 1.25 0.83 1.58 1.11
Japan 0.51 0.30 0.68 0.46 0.86 0.61
Developing Economies 0.65 0.39 0.88 0.59 1.11 0.79
Australasia and 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
South Africa
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iManufacturing Sector
Theoretical analysis. - In order to assess more accurately the
demand for oil in the industrial sector, we have divided this sector
into two subgroups on the basis of the nature of economic activity and
the possibility of interfuel substitution. Accordingly, we have defin-
ed the manufacturing sector, subgroup one, as consisting of all those
manufacturing activities where interfuel substitution is readily feasi-
ble. Subgroup two, the other industrial sector, is defined to include
all those oil-consuming industrial activities where possibilities of
i
interfuel substitution are limited. This sector includes agriculture,
residential and nonresidential construction, mining of metallic and
nonmetallic minerals, and chemical feedstocks. All other industrial
activities are included in the manufacturing sector.
In the manufacturing sector, fuel oil is used primarily to gener-
ate heat. This may be for space heat or for part of the production
process, e.g. drying in paper and textile production. Other types of
fuels are also used for the same purpose, so it is relatively easy to
substitute other fuels for oil in response to the rising price of oil.
The same arguments and data presented in discussion of the residential/
commercial and electric utility sectors are applicable to the manufac-
turing sector and need not be repeated.
Scenario assumptions and demand projections. - We project that
interfuel substitution in the manufacturing sector of the United States
will occur over the next 20-year period under one of the following
three scenarios. Figure 3 illustrates interfuel substitution rates for
each scenario.
Table 9 provides data on the demand for oil in the manufacturing
sector of the United States under the three assumed scenarios. In 1980
the demand for oil in the manufacturing sector was 1.05 MBOD. Our low-
conversion/high-demand scenario projects that the demand for oil will
decline to 0.64 MBOD by 1990 and to 0.21 MBOD by 2000. This represents
40 and 80 percent reductions in the demand for oil in the manufacturing
sector by the years 1990 and 2000, respectively, compared with their
1980 leve l-3. The remaining 60 and 20 percent of the demand for oil
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Table 9. Projected demand for oil in the manufacturing sector of the
United States.
TIME CUMULATIVE OIL UTILIZED
SCENARIO PERIOD DECLINE M (MBOD)
Historical 1980 1.05
Low Conversion/ 1990 40 0.64
High Demand
2000 80 0.21
Average Conversion/ 1990 55 0.48
Median Demand
2000 85 0.16
High Conversion/
	 1990	 70	 0.32
Low Demand
2000	 90	 0.11
f
t
z
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will be consumed by those establishments which continue to use oil as a 	 1
source of energy.
For the average-conversion/medium- demand scenario, different rates
of oil demand are projected. It is etimated that demand for oil will
decline from 1.05 MBOD in 1980 to 0.48 MBOD by 1990, and subsequently
to 0.16 MBOD by 2000. This represents a 55 percent decrease in the
demand for oil by the year 1990 and 85 percent by the year 2000 when
compared with the 1980 levels. The remaining demand will be forthcom-
ing in 1990 and 2000 from those manufacturing establishments which
continue to utilize oil as a source of energy in producing their out-
put.
Under the high-conversion/low-demand scenario, demand for oil is
projected to decline from 1.05 MBOD in 1980 to 0.32 MBOD by 1990, re-
sulting in a 70 percent decrease when compared with the 1980 level.
This decline is projected at 90 percent in the year 2000, contributing
to further reductions in the total demand for oil in the manufacturing
sector to 0.11 MBOD.
The various levels of demand for oil just projected under three
different scenarios depend on world oil prices. Higher prices hasten
interfuel substitution and, consequently, reduce the consumption of oil
in the manufacturing sector. Because firms in any country will respond
to resource price increases by cutting back consumption and by under-
taking resource input substitution, identical interfuel conversion
rates are applied to all manufacturing sectors in WOCA as in the United
States. Table 10 exhibits data indicating demand for oil in the manu-
facturing sectors of six selected areas for the years 1990 and 2000
under the three assumed scenarios. These data are in turn aggregated
to project the total demand for oil in WOCA for the years 1990 and
2000.
In summary, oil consumption in the manufacturing sectors of WOCA
is sensitive to higher oil prices. Such prices are expected to hasten
interfuel substitution, which we project will take place over the next 	 j
i
20 years under the assumed low, medium, and high demand scenarios. 	 j
Interfuel substitution is expected to lower oil consumption in the
i
manufacturing sector, thereby impacting the demand for oil in WOCA.
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Table 10. Projected demand for oil in the manufacturing sectors of
WOCA (million barrels of oil per day).
LOW DEMAND MEDIUM DEMAND HIGH DEMAND
AREAS SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
1_99_0. 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
WOCA 2.15 0.73 3.22 1.08 4.31 1.44
USA 0.32 0.11 0.48 0.16 0.64 0.21
Canada 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.04
Europe (Exc. Turkey) 0.96 0.32 1.43 0.48 1.91 0.64
Japan 0.44 0.15 0.66 0.22 0.89 0.30
Developing Economies 0.35 0.12 0.52 0.17 0.70 0.23
Australasia and 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02
South Africa
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Other Industrial Sector
Try ..
Theoretical analysis. - In this study we have defined the other
industrial sector to include those productive activities in which po-
tential for interfuel substitution is clearly limited. These activi-
ties comprise agricultural production, residential and nonresidential
construction, mining of metallic and nonmetallic minerals, and chemical
feedstocks. In agriculture, diesel oil is demanded for such uses as
mechanical plowing, harvesting, and fruit picking. This demand is
satisfied at diverse locations by making fuel available where produc-
tive activities are being carried out. Similarly, in residential and
nonresidential construction, the demand for oil is generated by numer-
ous earth-moving activities and movement of materials. As in the case
of agriculture, the demand for oil is satisfied by supplying it at
various construction sites to operate construction equipment. Analo-
gous arguments can be made for mining of metallic and nonmetallic min-
erals and, with some modification, for chemical feedstock. The crucial
point, however, is that, due to the peculiar character of production
processes in agriculture, construction, mining, and chemical feedstock,
the prospect for interfuel substitution is quite limited.
Oil consumption in the other industrial sector is directly related
to the level of output which, in turn, depends on economic growth
rates. High economic growth stimulates output, which requires increas-
ed usage of all factor inputs including the various types of industrial
fuels, i.e., middle distillates, gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, re-
sidual fuel oil, etc. Therefore, higher rates of growth of output in
the industrial sector mean higher demand for oil, and lower growth
rates mean lower demand. It can therefore be concluded that, due to
the limitation of interfuel substitution and because oil is a factor
input in the production process, the demand for oil in the industrial
sector may vary directly with the GNP growth rates for the decades of
the 80's and the 90's. Accordingly, we have made the following demand
projections by assuming low, medium, and high demand scenarios.
Scenario assumptions and demand projections. - An earlier section
of this paper examined historical GNP growth rates for WOCA and select-
ed geographic subareas. Growth rates were then projected for WOCA and
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six subareas under three demand scenarios. These CLIP growth rate
projections, shown in table 2, form the basis for projecting the demand
for oil in the other industrial sectors of WOCA and its six subareas.
For the United States, GNP growth rates of two, three, and four
percent are projected for the low, medium, and high demand scenarios.
Under the low-demand scenario, we project that a 2 percent annual rate
of CM growth in the United States for the decades of the 80's and the
90's will generate demand for industrial fuel oils amounting to 3.30
MBOD by 1990 and 4.00 MBOD in 2000. The figures are summarized in
table 11.
For the United States, economic growth rates averaging three
percent per year for the decades of the 80's and the 90's are projected
under the medium-demand scenario. Our etimates are that the demand for
oil in the industrial sector is expected to be 3.68 MBOD and 4.94 MBOD
in 1990 and 2000.
The high-demand scenario assumes economic growth rates in the
United States averaging 4 percent annually throughout the decades of
the 80's and the 90's. The demand for industrial fuel oils is, there-
fore, estimated to be 4.22 MBOD by 1990 and 6.43 MBOD by 2000.
The analysis applied to the United States has been extended to
WOCA. The demand for oil in the industrial sector of WOCA is assumed
to be a direct function of the GNP growth rates. Demand estimates have
beam projected for the years 1990 and 2000 by assuming different econo-
mic growth rates under low, medium, and high demand scenarios for all
areas comprising WOCA. These estimates are shown in table 11 and are
included in the total demand for oil in WOCA for the years 1990 and
2000.
In summary, there is a limited potential for interfuel substitu-
tion in the other industrial sector. The demand for industrial fuel
oils depends on the size of output, which in turn depends on the as-
sumptions of economic growth rates. Oil demand projections are made
for WOCA under low, medium, and high demand scenarios.
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Table 11. Projected demand for oil in the other industrial sectors of
WOCA (million barrels of oil per day).
i
LOW DEMAND	 MEDIUM DEMAND	 HIGH DEMAND
AREAS	 SCENARIO	 SCENARIO	 SCENARIO
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
WOCA 13.52 18.96 15.04 23.10 16.82 28.43
USA 3.30 4.00 3.68 4.94 4.22 6.43
Canada 0.42 0.59 0.49 0.79 0.53 0.91
Europe (Exc. Turkey) 3.56 4.43 4.09 5.77 4.65 7.35
Japan 1.45 2.05 1.61 2.50 1.98 3.72
Developing Economies 4.38 7.34 4.71 8.43 4.91 9.13
Australasia and 0.41 0.55 0.46 0.67 0.53 0.89
South Africa
J
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Transportation Sector
Theoretical analysis. - The transportation sector is a major consumer
of petroleum. In 1978 it consumed 53 percent of all the petroleum used
in the United States. Petroleum represents about 97 percent of this
sector's energy requirements (ref. 13). Transportation affects every
aspect of a nation's econoar. It promotes economic growth and the
delivery of social goods, enlarges the area consumers and industry may
draw upon for resources and products, and facilitates the distribution
I
of private goods and services. The resulting specialisation and econ-
omies of scale provide wider choices for consumers at lower prices.
Also, a viable transportation system shapes cities, unifies a nation,
makes the world accessible, and plays a key role in national defense
And international trade. Its lack could frustrate a nation's economic
and social growth.
In the United States, the transportation sector uses petroleum to
move people and commodities by five modes of travel: highway, air,
rail, marine, and pipeline. It is in this sector that the potential
for conservation and efficiency improvement in the use of petroleum is
extremely significant. A primary reason for this lies in the mandated
fuel economy improvements in the automobile industry and in the growing
emphasis on other modes of transportation, including mass transit and
the electric and hybrid vehicles. Furthermore, as the single largest
consumer of petroleum, the United States transportation system is high-
ly sensitive to oil price increases and petroleum supply uncertanties.
Higher fuel prices not only motivate changes in the driving habits
which enhance conservation, but also increase demand for more fuel-
efficient now cars whose efficiency is rapidly approaching the mandated
standards. For example, the average new car mileage expected by meet-
ing the standards in 1985 is approximately 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg).
The current General Motors fleet average for new car efficiency is
about 22.4 mpg and is expected to exceed the mandated standards by
averaging 31 mpg in 1985 (ref. 14). As more efficient new cars are
purchased and older loss efficient ones are scrapped, the average fleet
efficiency is expected to improve further. Conservation in fuel use by
automobiles is reinforced by a switch to diesel-powered vehicles, which
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are estimated to be 50 percent more efficient than gasoline-powered 	 I
automobiles.
Recently there has bean a growing emphasis on electric and hybrid
vehicles in the United States. Some 2,000 electric vehicles have been
built and offered for sale in this country (ref. 15). Hybrid vehicles
which are powered by a combinstice of electric motors and internal-
combustion engines are not yet commercially available. Emphasis on
electric and hybrid vehicles is based on conservation of fuel and the
following expectations:
(1) Electric or hybrid vehicles would successfully compete with
conventional vehicles in the urban market;
(2) The net effect if using electric-powered vehicles would be a
reduction in petroleum demand;
(3) if batteries are charged during periods of low electric de-
mand, i.c. during the night, utility peak-power requirements
would not be adversely affected and electric generation could
become more efficient; and
(4) Environmental protection would be facilitated because it is
easier to coatrol emission from a few stationary electric
power stations than from a large number of moving vehicles
(ref. 15).
The extent to which these expectations are met depends primarily
on battery development. The battery is the main constraint on the
ability of electric or hybrid vehicles to compete with liquid-fuel
vehicles. In the near future, throe batteries, lea& acid, nickel-iron,
and nickel-zinc have a reasonable chance of becoming commercially
available. At the present time, none of these batteries p `7ssesses the
power, endurance, or conversion efficiency which would enable the bat-
tery-powered vehicles to match the performance of conventional auto-
mobiles. General Motors Corporation plans to introduce a small elac-
triil powered car in the 1984 model year with a cop speed of 80.5 km/hr
(50 mph) and a range of 161 km (100 mi) without recharging the battery
(ref. 14).	 +
i
Due to limited range and acceleration, near-future application of	
t
electric vehicles is likely to be confined to a fsw co vwrcial vehicles
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for urban use. These are not expected to be common as second family
cars until the 1990's at the earliest. The extent of their market
penetration through the year 2000 is uncertain and depends heavily on
the rate of battery development and government incentives for commer-
cialization.
Scenario assumptions and demand projections. - In projecting de-
mand for oil in the transportation sector of the United States, we
have relied heavily on estimates made by many private and government
studies, including one by the Presidential Study Commission. The most
notable feature of these studies is the anticipated decline of the rate 	 a
of growth in oil demand throughout the decades of the 1980's and the
1990'x. Table 12 lists these studies as well as their projected de-
mands for oil in the years 1990 and 2000. The estimates vary from 9.82
MBOD to 11.70 MBOD for the year 1990 and from 10.13 MBOD to 13.17 MBOD
for the year 2000.
As shown in table 12, estimates by the Presidential Study Commis-
sion fall right at the mean of the studies cited for both 1990 and
2000. For this reason we have chosen to use the Presidential Study
Commission's figures as our projections of the demand for oil in the
transportation sector of the United States. Accordingly, we estimate
the demand for oil to be 10.48 MBOD in 1990 and 11.55 MBOD in 2000 for
the medium-demand scenario. For the low-demand scenario our etimates
are 8.79 MBOD and 9.40 MBOD for the years 1990 and 2000, respectively.
Under the high-demand scenario we project the demand for oil to be
11.00 MBOD in the year 1990 and 13.30 MBOD is the year 2000.
Similar studies of petroleum demand in the transportation sectors
of other countries throughout WOCA are not available, so a different
method of projection is necessary. In the rest of WOCA the outlook for
petroleums demand in transportation is quite different from the United
States. For the past three or four decades the heart of the transpor-
tation system in the United States has been the large, high-powered,
low-efficiency automobile. One happy implication of this fact is that
great improvements in fuel efficiency can be achieved in the coming two
decades in the U.S. transportation sector.
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Table 12. Projections of demand for petroleum in the transportation
sector of the United States (million barrels of oil per
day).
SOURCE	 1990	 2000
ri
a. Presidential Study Commission
b. Stanford Research Institute
c. Department of Transportation
d. Office of Technology Assessment
e. Department of Energy
f. Data Resources, Inc.
g. Exxon
h. Pace
	
10.48
	
11.55
	
11.70
	
13.17
9.82
	
11.04
	
12.56
	
9.82
	
11.14
	9 88
	
11.14
	10.0
	
10.13
11.14
Average	 10.50	 11.60
Source: refs. 13, 16 to 22
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In the rest of WOCA, however, they have not relied upon the large
inefficient automobile. Other countries already use mass transit sys-
tems and the smaller automobiles to which the U.S. is now converting.
These other countries will not be able to achieve improvements in effi-
ciency comparable to that projected for the U.S. Some improvements, of
course, will be made, but they will be more difficult to effect and of
smaller magnitude.
Therefore, for the rest of WOCA the authors project that the
transportation demand for petroleum will increase. Since transporta-
tion is an input in the production process, we can expect the demand
for petroleum in transportation to increase roughly in proportion to
the level of production. Therefore, in these countries we have in-
creased the demand for petroleum in the transportation sector at the
same rate that GNP is projected to grow. These data are presented in
table 13 along with figures for the United States and the aggregation
for WOCA for the years 1990 and 2000.
This completes our examination of the demand for petroleum in
WOCA. In the next section we turn to an analysis of the supply side of
the market. Following that, we put demand and supply together to
search for price implications.
Summary
The various procedures used to project the demand for petroleum
are summarized in table 14. In three sectors of the economy, residen-
tial/commercial, electric utilities, and manufacturing, recent price
increases and governmental mandate have initiated a process of conser-
vation and conversion that will progressively reduce the demand for
petroleum over the next 20 years. Conversion is projected at somewhat
different rates in each of the three sectors depending on particular
conditions. Identical rates are used for all six geographic areas of
WOCA.
In the other industrial sector, substitution of other fuels for
oil will be far more difficult, if possible at all. Therefore, the
demand for oil in this sector is projected to increase at the same rate
1
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Table 13. Projected demand for oil in the transportation sectors of
WOCA (million barrels of oil per day).
LOW-DEMAND
SCENARIO
1990 2000
22.31 29.28
8.79 9.40
1.01 1.42
4.34 5.40
1.54 2.17
6.00 10.06
0.63 0.83
MEDIUM-DEMAND
SCENARIO
1990 2000
25.50 35.71
10.48 11.55
1.17 1.88
4.99 7.04
1.71 2.66
6.45 11.56
0.70 1.02
HIGH-DEMAND
SCENARIO
1990 2000
27.59 42.28
11.00 13.30
1.28 2.20
5.66 8.96
2.11 3.96
6.73 12.51
0.81 1.35
WOCA
USA
Canada
Europe (Exc. Turkey)
Japan
Developing Economies
Australasia and
South Africa
a
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Table 14. Summary of demand projection procedures.
Sector
Residential/
Commercial
Electric Utilities
Manufacturing
U.S.A.	 Other WOCA
Conservatioa and	 Same as U.S.A.
Conversion
Increased at GNP
Other Industrial	 Growth Rate	 Same as U.S.A.
Data Projected by	 Increase at GNP
Transportation	 Presidential Study
	 Growth Rate
Commission
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as GNP. Separate GNP growth rates are projected for each of the six
geographic areas of WOCA.
The demand for petroleum in the transportation sector of the
United States is generally expected to decline as the size of the auto-
mobile is scaled down and gas mileage is increased. We have used pro-
jections made by the Presidential Study Commission.
In the rest of WOCA similiar fuel savings are not likely to be
made. Therefore, for the rest of WOCA the demand for petroleum in
transportation is projected to increase at the same rate as GNP for
each of the five subareas. '
Separate projections of the demand for oil have been made for five
economic sectors, six geographic areas, two time periods, and three
scenarios, for a total of 180 projections. These data are summarized
for WOCA and presented in tables 15 and 16. Table 15 also shows a
breakdown for each sector, and table 16 shows totals for each subarea.
row'
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9Table 15. Projected demand for oil in WOCA by economic sectors
(million barrels of oil per day).
,l
LOW-DEMAND MEDIUM-DEMAND HIGH-DEMAND
SECTORS SCENARIO SCENARIO
j
SCENARIO
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Residential/Commercial 5.00 2.22 5.96 3.26 6.90
a
4.45
Electric Utilities 2.91 1.75 3.93 2.63 4.95 3.50
Manufacturing 2.15 0.73 3.22 1.08 4.31 1.44
Other Industrial 13.52 18.96 15.04 23.10 16.82 28.43
j'
Transportation 22.31 29.28 25.50 35.71 27.59 42.28
WOCA 45.89 52.94 53.65 65.78 60.57 80.10
Source: stables 5, 8, 10, 11, and 13
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Table 16. Projected demand for oil in WOCA by geographic areas
(million barrels of oil per day).
F LOW-DEMAND MEDIUM-DEMAND HIGH-DEMAND
AREAS SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
i 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
i
I
USA 15.00 14.00 17.86 18.52 19.69 22.49
i
Canada 1.80 2.16 2.12 2.90 2.35 3.44
Europe 11.55 11.48 13.87 15.29 16.23 19.63
I
Japan
`
4.27 4.82 5.07 6.06 6.30 8.88
Developing Economies 12.13 18.24 13.46 21.25 14.48 23.32
Australasia and 1.14 1.44 1.29 1.76 1.50 2.33
South Africa
i
i
WOCA total 45.89 52.94 53.67 65.78 60.55 80.09
Source: tables 5, 8, 10, 11, and 13
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SUPPLY ANALYSIS
Introduction
For purpose of this study, the principal factors directly affect-
ing the future supply of oil are
(1) the magnitude of proven reserves,
(2) net additions to proven reserves,
(3) the minimum ratio of reserves to production (R/P ratio,)
(4) the rate of oil production that exporting countries permit,
(S) net imports from the Communist countries, and
(6) synfuel production.
These six factors are not the traditional determinants of supply,
e.g. product price, technology, and expected future prices, which are
the more basic, elementary factors that determine supply. However, for
this analysis we have found it more convenient to organize our discus-
sion around the six factors listed above, which more directly affect
the supply of oil.
After analyzing each of these factors theoretically and empirical-
ly, alternative specific assumptions are made concerning each of these
factors over the next 20 years. These specific assumptions are the
supply inputs for the three scenarios to be used to project future
petroleum prices.
Magnitude of Proven Reserves
Proven reserves of oil are estimated to be economically attractive
to produce under current conditions from fields where oil content has	 i
been confirmed by drilling and testing. Proven oil reserve figures
published at the end of each year are derived from estimates made by
oil companies and governments of oil-producing countries. The esti-
mates are stated to be reserves recoverable at current prices and with
current technology. They include oil recoverable by primary production
methods as well as by secondary or tertiary recovery where the poten-
tial has been evaluated and facilities are planned.
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Estimates of proven reserves are subject to such uncertainty and
can change up or down from year to year as new assessments are made.
However, for the past four years estimates published in the Oil and Gas
Journal have been fairly stable at about 350 billion barrels of proven
oil reserves for the world outside the Communist areas (WOCA). In this
analysis we begin with the figures published at the and of 1976. At
that date OPEC proven reserves were 443 billion barrels and non-OPEC
reserves were 102.5 billion barrels (ref. 23).
Proven reserves for future years are then estimated by adding
gross additions for the year and subtracting production for the year.
This adjustment gives us proven reserves at the beginning of the
following year. Proven reserves for the following year are then
estimated in the same fashion.
Additions to Proven Reserves
Introduction
Gross additions to proven reserves result from genuine new discov-
eries, revised estimates of previously discovered fields, and improved
recovery techniques. These sources are discussed in the subsections
which follow.
Genuine New Discoveries
How much petroleum was originally in the ground that could eventu-
ally be extracted and how much is still there? Since 1960 most esti-
mates of the world's total ultimately recoverable reserves of conven-
tional oil have ranged from 1,800 to 2,200 billion barrels. Cumulative
world production in 1979 was 430 billion barrels, and proven reserves
were 640 billion barrels. Thus, there remain some 800 to 1,100 billion
barrels of recoverable conventional oil yet to be discovered (ref. 4).
The important question for projecting productin over the next 20
years is not how such oil is yet undiscovered, but at what rate it will
be discovered. Genuine new discoveries in the past would have been
much lower without the discovery of the massive oil reserves of the
Middle East. Over half of WOCA oil reserves have been found in an area
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some 1,287 by 805 k m'(800 x 500 mi). The chances that such a prolific
region will be found again are small.
Since the resource base is finite, the oil remaining to be found
must decline as oil is discovered. The most promising areas will be
drilled first, and as the search moves into less likely areas, the
discovery rate will probably decline. It therefore seem unlikely that
genuine new discoveries will be maintained at the rate achieved over
the past two decades.
Revised Estimates
Since 1950 revised estimates of previously discovered fields have
been quite large. In 1950 the Oil and Gas Journal estimated proven
reserves of WOCA to be 72 billion barrels. We now know that those
fields actually contained 300 billion barrels, so 230 billion barrels
have been added to proven reserves by reassessment of earlier estimates
(ref. 4). There are two reasons for the large sire of this reassess-
ment. First, prior to 1960 oil was being discovered at a very rapid
rate relative to production, and production was being rapidly expanded.
Under those conditions there was little pressure to be overly concerned
about the exact size of recoverable reserves in a newly discovered
field. Second, there was tremendous progress in seismic techniques in
the 1960'x. This has resulted in a much earlier and more accurate
estimate of recoverable oil in a new field. Thus, additions to re-
serves due to revising estimates of previously discovered fields will
probably be much lower in the next two decades than in the past two.
Improved Recovery Techniques
Future additions to reserves are more likely to be obtained by
improved recovery techniques. The primary method of oil production
uses pressure within the ground to force oil to the surface (ref. 24).
This pressure is generally sufficient to force out only about 25 per-
cent of the oil in the ground, depending on the viscosity of the oil
and the structure of the surrounding rock.
After the natural pressure has dissipated, enhanced recovery tech-
niques may be used to get more oil out of the well. These include
practices such as injecting water or gas into the well to increase the
7.
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internal pressure and injecting chemicals or beat to reduce the viscos-
ity of the oil erd increase the flow of oil to the we'.1. These enhanc-
ad recovery techniques hold great promise, but such technology yet
remains to be developed for this payoff to be realised.
The average recovery rate in the United States has already risen
from 25 to 32 percent (i.e., 68 percent of oil remains in the ground).
`	 The increase in oil prices in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80 certainly
increased the incentive to use secondary and tertiary techniques and
will continue to increase that incentive in the future. if the average
global recovery rate could be increased to 40 percent by the year 2000.
proven reserves would be increased by 60 percent (based on a present
world recovery rate of 252). it is likely that recovery rates will
improve gradually, and annual additions to reserves from enhanced
recovery will initially be small, but will increase over the next 20
years.
Ristorical Review
Figure 4 shows annual gross additions to proven reserves in WOCA
from 1950 to 1979. Five-year averages are shown to remove year-to-year
variability. The data are obtained from year-end estimates of proven
reserves published in Oil and Gas Journal.
The most unusual period in the past 30 years was 1965-70, when
gross additions were more than double the average. The large volume of
gross additions was due primarily to reassessment of fields previously
discovered, particularly in the Middle East. As previously discussed, 	
i
reassessment on tais massive scale is not likely to be repeated in the
future.
Omitting the 1965-70 period, gross additions have fluctuated sur-
prisingly little around an average of about 21 billion barrels per
year. Gross additions outside the Middle East have been more stable
than the total. The greatest variability has been in the Middle East.
Outside the Middle East, gross additions since 1955 have averaged
about 10.1 billion barrels per year (omitting 1965-70). The five- year
averages have all been within a range of 1.3 billion barrels. Gross
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Figure 4. Gross additions tc proven oil reserves in WOCA, 1950-79.
Data are five-year averages obtained by comparing year-end estimates
published in Oil and Gas Journal.
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additions in the last four years were virtually as great as in the late
1950's and somewhat higher than in the early 60's.
Like politics, oil discoveries in the Middle East have been more
volatile than elsewhere. Cross additions in this &r" declined gently
from 1950 to 1965. then jumped in 1965 as previousl y noted. Since
then, gross additions have declined dramatically fram 32 billion bar-
rels to a mere 6.4 billion barrels annually in the past 4 years.
Scenario Assumptions
Based on the preceding theoretical analysis and historical review,
we believe that gross additions to proven reserves in WOCA will average
15 billion barrels annually over the next 20 years. it seems very
unlikely that the average will fall below 12 billion. and equally
unlikely that it will exceed 18 billion barrels per year.
It is not possible t-, say how much of this will coma from each of
the thro* sources of gross additions. Early in the period most addi-
tions to proven reserves will no doubt be from new discoveries and
reassessments. As we get closer to the year 2000. relatively more
will come from enhanced recovery as the technological problems are
Sradually overcome.
Since World War II, discoveries iv the Middle East have overshad-
oved those in the rest of the world. This will not be repeated in the
future. UnC-%btedly there is still more oil to be found in the Middle
East. Indeed, proven reserves in Saudi Arabia increased just last
year. Rowever, it is extremely unlikely that core giant fields will be
discovered in this tiny area. Tuture discoveries will be considerably
more modest.
On the other hand, improvements in recovery techniques will be
more beneficial in the Middle East than elsewhere. This is because the
Middle East already has large reserves to which the improved techniques
can be applied. Thus, gross additions to reserves in the Middle East
will continue in the next 20 years, but not at the level of the past.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we have constructed a supply
projection for this study on the assumption that tvc-thirds of the
t
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gross additions will be in non-OPEC countries and one-third will be in
OPEC countries.
In summary, our most likely scenario assumes gross additions to
proven reserves in WOCA of 15 billion barrels per year. The low-supply
scenario assumes gross additions of 12 billion, and the high-supply
scenario assumes 18 billion barrels annually. In all three scenarios,
two-thirds of gross additions are assumed to be in the non-OPEC areas
and one-third within OPEC.
Reserve-to-Production Ratio
Theoretical Analysis
There are several factors that prohibit a newly discovered field
from being fully exploited in a short period of time. As discussed pre-
viously, the primary method of oil production uses pressure within the
ground to force oil to the surface. If the oil is extracted too fast
or if too many wells are drilled into the same field, the amount of oil
that can eventually be recovered is reduced. Thus, it is in the eco-
nomic interest of the owner to exploit the field slowly. After the
natural press-,,•e has dissipated, enhanced recovery techniques may be
used to get more oil out of the well. The use of these enhanced recov-
ery techniques means that more time wall be required to exploit the
field.
Additional time is required to develop the infrastructure neces-
sary to exploit the field. If the new field is close to existing,
producing fields, a new discovery may be brought into production within
two years. However, in more remote and inhospitable environments, such
as the North Sea or Alaska, 5 to 10 years may elapse between discovery
and the beginning of production.
Thus, it takes an average of approximately 15 years to exploit a
newly discovered field. This means that, so long as new discoveries
continue at the same rate, it would be difficult to increase production
so fast that the ratio of proven reserves to annual production (R/P
ratio) would fall below 15 to 1 (ref. 6). When new discoveries begin
to decline (or cease altogether) production can be maintained but re-
serves will decline. At that time, the R/P ratio would then fall below
15 to 1. It will eventually reach zero when reserves are exhausted.
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Empirical Review
Soma recent R/P ratios for selected countries and areas are shown
in table 17. Production figures for 1978 rather than for 1979 are used
due to the production distortions that occurred in 1979. Highest of
all are the 6 OPEC countries in the Biddle East with a combined R/P
ratio of 49. Reserves in this area are so huge that they do not pre-
sent any technical limit on production and likely will not within the
next decade and perhaps longer. These countries could easily double
their production rate if they chose to and if they were willing to
invest in the capital facilities necessary to do so.
The remaining OPEC nations face totally different circumstances.
For the four African nations the R/P ratio is down to 27. Of these,
Libya possesses most of the excess reserves, while the other three are
virtually down to their technical limit. For the other three OPEC
countries, the R/P ratio has fallen to 20, which is considered very
low. This means that these countries have little capacity to increase
production unless more oil is discovered.
Among the non-OPEC nations there is considerable diversity. As
one might expect the R/P ratio for the U.S. is quite low (8). This
reflects the fact that new discoveries in the U.S. have peaked and have
been declining in recent years. On the other hand, R/P ratios for
Mexico and Western Europe are fairly high - even higher than the
African OPEC countries. These high ratios are due to the large recent
discoveries in these areas and to the fact that production is not yet
up to its full level. The R/P ratio for the non-OPEC portion of WOCA
as a whole is 15.
Scenario Assumptions
OPEC countries. - In the seven OPEC countries of the Middle East
plus Libya, proven oil reserves are so vast and R/P ratios so high that
the availability of reserves does not present a relevant technical
limit to oil production at the present time. Nor 	 it likely to do so
within the next decade and perhaps not even in the 1990's. It is much
more likely that these nations will establish production limits well
below what would be technically possible. This line of thought will be
pursued in the following section.
63
Table 17. Reserve-to-production ratios for selected countries
areas.
RESERVES 1978 PRODUCTION R/P
AREA 1-1-79 RATIO
109 bbl* 106 bbl/day 109 bbl/yr Column (I)* Column (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4
OPEC 445.1 30.2 10.87 41
Mid East 365.0 20.7 7.45 49
Africa 50.8 5.3 1.91 27
Other OPEC 29.4 4.1 1.48 20
Non-OPEC 102.5 18.7 6.73 15
USA 28.5 10.3 3.71 b
Canada 6.0 1.6 0.58 10
Mexico 16.0 1.3 0.47 34
West Europe 24.0 1.8 0.65 37
Other Non-OPEC 28.0 3.7 1.33 21
*bbl - barrels
Sources:
Reserves, ref. 23
Production, ref. 25
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For the remaining six OPEC members the low and declining R/P
ratios could become relevant technical limits on oil production, but
even here it is more likely that they will establish production limits
below the level that would be technically feasible. Thus, R/P ratio is
not considered the relevant factor constraining OPEC oil production for
the period under consideration.
Non-OPEC countries. - In the non-OPEC countries matters are quite
l
different. Reserves are already falling in the U.S. and Canada. Even
in Mexico and the North Sea reserves are expected to peak within the
decade. For the entire non-OPEC area the R/P ratio is down to 15.
Thus, the availability of reserves will be a relevant factor limiting
oil production.
For this study we assume that the R/P ratio for the non-OPEC area
of WOCA remains at 15. In other words, non- OPEC oil production for
each year is taken to be one-fifteenth of proven reserves at the begin-
ning of the year (assuming that there is adequate demand for this vol-
ume of oil). This same procedure is followed for all three scenarios.
OPEC Production Limits
Political and Economic Nature of OPEC
There is a great lack of understanding among professional analysts
concerning the basic nature and functioning of OPEC. There is even
greater misunderstanding among the populace. Consider, for example,
two statements reported in the Wall Street Journal. On the one hand an
aide to PLO chieftain Yasser Arafat says, 'Oil is a political weapon
for Arabs to use for their ends." At the other end of the spectrum, an
OPEC official in Vienna says, 'OPEC is not a political organization.
We reach our decisions on the basis of economic data" (ref. 26).
The first statement is probably closer to public opinion, but the
second seems to be closer to reality. The single overt political ac-
tion taken by OPEC since its inception was the oil embargo in late
1973.* This action was in response to the Israeli-Egyptian War in which
Egypt was being soundly defeated.
*Technically it was OAPEC that established the embargo, not OPEC.
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skThe quadrupling of oil prices at to sane time was far more signi-
ficant than the embargo. This was a distinctly economic action, not
I	 ^
political.'
Since then there has been a great deal of talk about the politics
`
	
	
of oil from every possible vantage point. No doubt there is great
potential to use oil policies for political purposes. Nevertheless,
since 1973 OPEC has not engaged in another overtly political act.
Even the Iranian cutback in 1979 was not an OPEC action. It was 	 i3
the act of an independent, revolutionary government, and it came in the 	 t
disorganized period of transition between regimes. This may be consid-
ered a political act, but definitely not an OPEC act. 	 t
There is no general consensus among professional analysts concern-
ing the economic nature of OPEC at this time (refs. 27-30). For
example, in the popular press the term 'OPEC cartel" is commonplace.
Indeed, there is no doubt expressed that OPEC is a cartel and can set
oil prices at any arbitrary level they please. However, a considerable
volume of professional literature has arisen concerning whether OPEC is
truly a cartel with considerable monopoly power or whether OPEC merely
responds to market forces that would operate in its absence. The evi-
dence is by no means obvious and overwhelming. Thus, in the present
state of knowledge, any statements concerning projections of OPEC
policies as far as 20 years into the future must be shrouded in consid-
erable uncertainty.
A Passive Supply Policy
In spite of this uncertainty, it has become quite clear that the
governments of the OPEC nations will not permit oil production to con-
tinue to increase passively in response to growing demand from the oil-
importing nations. A passive supply policy would lead to rapid growth
of production until a peak is reached, then declining reserves would
force a decline in production. Such a policy would have several disad-
vantages. First, increasing production would require the installation
of extensive capital facilities which would then become redundant as
production declined. Second, it would reduce potential revenue as oil
would be sold too soon at too low a price. Third, it would result in a
very uneven flow of oil revenue. Thus, there can be no doubt that the
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OPEC nations will choose to limit production below the level that would
be technically feasible.
At exactly what level they will set production limits, however, is
uncertain. In the first place OPEC, as an organization, has absolutely
no production policy and no mechanism to enforce one. There is consid-
erable opposition within OPEC to the establishment of any official OPEC
production policy. Saudi Arabia in particular has steadfastly insisted
that production policies are the sovereign right of each member nation.
What can be said regarding likely production policies of these indi-
vidual nations?
A Dichotomy of OPEC Nations
Describing a simple dichotomy of any group so diverse as the 13
members of OPEC must necessarily be on somewhat shaky logical grounds.
However, it is helpful to do so for the purpose at hand: The first
group is led by and epitomized by Algeria. Algeria has a poor popula-
tion of nearly 20 million (ref. 31) and an oil industry that has
already started the period of decline to depletion. They have large
immediate needs for oil revenues. They ran sizable balance of trade
deficits through the late 1970's in spite of the 1973 price increase.
They barely squeaked out a surplus in 1979 and will probably return to
a deficit by next year. They have every reason for wanting to push the
price of oil up as fast and as far as possible. This would permit them
to cut production and delay depletion of this valuable resource. Other
OPEC nations fitting into this group are Nigeria, Gabon, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Indonesia, and Iran.
But every producer doesn't necessarily have the same idea. The
second group is led by and epitomized by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
has a small population of only 8 million and enough oil to last 50 or
60 years at current production rates. They were running a $1 billion
balance of trade surplus as long ago as 1970. In the fourth quarter of
1979 their balance of trade surplus was running at a $47 billion annual
rate. They have virtually no need for additional revenues at the pre-
sent time. They do, however, have to worry about the future when the
wells in Algeria, Nigeria, and Indonesia have gone dry. They know
that, as the price of oil goes up, consumers will conserve on the use
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of oil and substitute other energy sources for oil. More importantly,
if the price is driven up too fast and too far, the consuming nations
will be stimulated into developing energy substitutes. They do not
want to be facing stiff competition from an abundance of oil substi-
tutes such as coal, oil shale, heavy oil sands, nuclear power, and
solar power made profitable by the high price of oil. Other OPEC coun-
tries in this group are Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and, to
a lesser extent, Iraq and Libya.
However, it should not be concluded that this second group of OPEC
countries will aggressively increase production even though they may
not want the price of oil to rise too rapidly. There is a second force
affecting their economic interest and their production policies. That
is the question of what to do with their oil revenues. Broadly speak: 	 f
ing, there are two uses for these funds: financing imports for domes-
tic consumption or investment purposes and investment abroad.
These six OPEC countries have used their oil revenues to increase
imports at a very rapid rate (see table 18). From 1975 to 1979 their
combined imports increased 222 percent from $17.5 billion to 56.4 bil-
lion. In spite of this increase in imports, their combined balance of
trade surplus (i.e. exports minus imports) increased 76 percent from
$42.3 billion to $74.5 billion. In the final quarter of 1979 their
combined balance of trade surplus was running at an annual rate of
$104.5 billion. This is a tremendous sum of money seeking foreign
investment outlets.
Some of the OPEC surplus has gone into direct foreign investment;
however, there is considerable political opposition abroad to sizable
direct investment by the Arab oil sheiks. For example, in the past
year three large investment deals by Kuwait in the United States have
fallen through, partially due to public opposition. As a result, most
of these surpluses have gone into commercial bank time deposits and
short-term money market instruments.
Ali D. Johany, a Saudi economist at the University of California,
examined the opportunity cost of capital for Saudi Arabia and concluded
that, for large sums of money, U.S. Government Treasury Bills appear to
represent the most attractive alternative to leaving oil in the ground
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Table 18. Combined exports, imports, and balance of trade surpluc for
six OPEC countries& , 1975-79 (in billions of dollars).
DATE EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE OF TRADE
SURPLUS
t
1975
i
59.8 17.5 42.3
1979 130.9 56.4 74.5
IV Qtr. 1979 170.9 66.4 104.5
Annual Rate
&Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and
Libya.
bSource: ref. 31
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(ref. 32). Treasury Sill rates have fluctuated between 8 and 12 per-
cent— primarily in response to varying inflation rates. After adjust-
ing for inflation, the real rate of return is hardly more than one per-
cent. This is certainly a very poor alternative to leaving oil in the
s	 ground.
Some Empirical Evidence
There are some clues regarding probable OPEC production limits.
Some relevant data are accumulated in table 19. The second column
shows current production capacity in each of the OPEC countries as
limited by presently installed facilities. Current OPEC production
capacity totals 39 MBOD. This seems to be well above the level of
production that will be permitted--at least for several years.
Seven of the OPEC countries have individually announced production
limits. These are shown in the last column. Iran has not announced an
official limit, but has cut back production and indicated that they
intend to keep production well below the level that was reached under
the Shah. We have estimated their probable limit at four MBOD.
Of the five remaining countries that have not announced production
limits, four are constrained by presently low R/P ratios. Only Iraq
has sufficient reserves to be able to increase production to any signi-
ficant extent, and they have shown no inclination to do so. If the
announced production limits are in fact observed, total OPEC production
capacity is reduced from 39 to 30.5 MBOD.
Another clue regarding possible production limits is given in
column 3 of table 19. In 1979 oil companies were scrambling to build
up depleted inventories and to stockpile oil in anticipation of rising
prices. This sharp increase in demand put heavy pressure on the pro-
ducing countries to increase production, and the increasing price pro-
vided economic incentive for them to do so. Most of the OPEC countries
responded to these circumstances by increasing production, and OPEC
production for 1979 was greater than that for 1978 in spite of Iran's
cutback. Column 3 shows for each OPEC country the peak level of pro-
duction that was sustained for at least three months.
A number of countries permitted production to exceed their an-
nounced limits. Saudi Arabia, in particular, increased production up
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Table 19. Indicators of OPEC production limits (million barrels of oil
}	 per day).a
COUNTRY PRODUCTION PEAK 3-NDNTR ANNOUNCED
CAPACITY PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
IN 1979 LIMITS
Saudi Arabia 11.9 9.8 8.5
Iran 6.7 3.0 4.Ob
Iraq 3.7 3.5
Kuwait 3.4 2.6 2.0
United Arab Emirates	 2.1 1.8 1.8
Qatar 0.7 0.5 0.5
Libya 2.5 2.1 2.0
Algeria 1.2 1.2
Nigeria 2.4 2.4
Gabon 0.2 0.2
Venezuela 2.5 2.3 2.2
Ecuador 0.2 0.2 0.2
Indonesia 1.8 1.6
Total 39.3 31.2
Production capacity if announced limits are observed: 30.5
°Sources
Production capacity: (ref. 29)
Peak production: (ref. 10)
Production limits: (ref. 4)
bUnofficial but probable limit
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to 9.8 MBOD and kept production up to 9.5 MBOD into late 1980. Even
they, however, did not increase production up to their capacity of 11.9
MBOD. By this measure OPEC production limits in 1979 were 31.2 MBOD.
These data indicate that OPEC production limits at the present
time are in the range of 30 to 32 MBOD. Them are indications, how-
ever, that these limits will be increased somewhat as time passes. In
1979 Sheik Yemeni, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, published an article
on the future of OPEC (ref. 33). In one scenario he projected that
OPEC production might rise to 36 MBOD in 1987. He referred to this
possibility as "normal resource utilization" by the OPEC countries. In
another scenario he projected that OPEC production might increase to 47
MBOD by 1995, which he referred to as "strained resource utilization"
by the OPEC countries.
Scenario Assumptions
On the basis of the foregoing theoretical analysis and empirical
data, we conclude that the OPEC countries will continue to expand oil
output in response to increasing demand. They will not, however, do so
indefinitely. For our most likely scenario we have assumed that the
OPEC countries will limit production to 36 MBOD. It seems highly un-
likely that they would limit production to less than 33 MBOD, which is
our lows-supply scenario assumption. Finally, it also seems highly
unlikely that they would increase production beyond 39 MBOD, which we
take as our high-supply scenario assumption.
Net Imports from the Communist Countries
The Soviet Bloc
Historical trends. - Oil production and consumption for the com-
bined areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe are shown in figure 5. From
1968 to 1974 both oil production and consumption were growing at very
rapid rates. Consumption was increasing somewhat more rapidly, and, if
these trends had continued, the Soviet Bloc would have ceased to become
a net exporter of oil by 1979. However, beginning in 1975 the growth
rate in consumption of oil declined while the previous growth in
r
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production was sustained. As a result, Soviet Bloc oil exports gradu-
ally increased from 1975 through 1978. If these trands were to contin-
ue, the Soviet Bloc would continue to be a net exporter of oil to NOCA
through the 1980's.
Soviet oil problems. - It appears, however, that these trends
cannot be continued. The Soviet Union seems to be reaching a watershed
such as the U.S. did in 1970. The most extensive analysis of the
Soviet oil problem is that of the CIA, first published in 1977 and up-
dated in 1979 (refs. 35 and 36). According to the CIA, output is now
stagnating or declining in all major Soviet oil-producing regions o -
cept western Siberia. In that area a single giant field, Samotlor, has
accounted for the bulk of the growth in Soviet oil production in the
1970's. The Samotlor field has been worked extensively, and production
there will probably peak within a year or two and begin to decline.
This will be a momentous event in the Soviet oil industry.
If a decline in total output is to be averted, new fields must be
brought into production. The Soviet hierarchy is aware of this prob-
lem, and in Deceeber 1977 the energy sector was designated a "leading
link," meaning that the sector would get priority investment to achieve
"maximum rapid results."
There are, however, serious obstacles to rapid achievement of sig-
nificant results. In the first place, the Soviets' stock of proven re-
serves has been falling since the early 1970's. In the second place,
most of the new areas being developed are in western Siberia. Not only
is there a harsh climate to contend with, but the associated infra-
structure must be developed. As a result, drilling targets, though
substantially increased, are not being met, and the development of new,
smaller fields is lagging behind plans.
In time the production decline may be moderated and perhaps re-
versed, by enhanced recovery techniques and by discovering and develop-
ing new areas. These developments are uncertain and subject to lung
lead-times. They will not affect oil production before the late
1980's.
Recent production developments. - When the CIA study was first
published, it was not well received by the oil industry press. Recent
74
events, however, tend to indicate that it is not fir off the mark.
Soviet oil production increased at a steady 6.3 percent annual rate
through 1975. Then in 1979 the increase dropped to 2.3 percent.
Moscow has just recently reported that planned production for 1981 is
only 0.7 percent greater than that of 1980 (ref. 34). This is a
dramatic decline in the growth rate in a very short period of time.
The CIA timetable slay have been a bit accelerated, but the analysis of
`	 basic forces seems quite accurate.
Conservation and energy substitution. - The growth rates of oil
consumption in both the USSR and Eastern Europe have been among the
highest in the world. After the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74,
the growth rate of oil consumption in the Soviet Bloc was reduced sub-
stantially, although at 5.5 percent it still remains among the highest
in the world (rat. 25). If the oil production problems outlined in the
previous section cannot be overcome, the growth rate in oil consumption
must be sharply curtailed within the next few years. This can be ac-
complished by (1) conservation efforts, (2) by substituting other er.<r-
gy sources for oil, or (3) by a reduction in the economic growth rate;
however, the first two actions will be difficult to achieve.
The pattern of Soviet energy consumption is substantially differ-
ent from that in Western industrial countries. In the West much oil is
used in the residential and transportation sectors, and the potential
for conservation in these uses is great. In the USSR many techniques
now being discussed and adopted in the West are already employed on a
large scale. for example, most urban space heating in the USSR is
already provided through cogeneration.
In the transportation sector the bulk of intercity freight is
shipped by rail, rather than by truck as in the, U.S. and Europe. The
Soviets have only one automobile for every 40 to 50 inhabitants, cosy
pared with 1 for every 2 in the U.S. and one for every 4 or S in West-
ern Europe (ref. 35). Thus, there is substantially less potential for
oil savings in these areas. Therefore, major savings in oil consump-
tion must be obtained by upgrading industrial technology. This can, of
course, be accomplished, but it is both capital intensive and time con-
suming. Dramatic short-run results are not to be expected.
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Scenario assumptions. - The analysis of the preceding sections leads
to :onclude that Soviet Bloc oil production will peak in the very ne
future and probably decline moderately for perhaps a decade before
stabilizing. The growth rate of oil consumption will not likely be
much below the economic growth rate, which is projected at about three
percent. Given that Soviet net export of oil in 1980 was only some one
million barrels per day, it seems inescapable that the Soviet Bloc will
cease to be a net exporter at some point in the relatively near term.
This basic conclusion holds over a wide range of specific assump-
tions concerning the rate of decline in production and the rate of
growth in consumption. The only variation is the specific year that
exports will cease. For example, if production peaks in 1981 and then
declines by two percent per year while consumption increases by three
percent annually, exports will end in 1983. On the other hand, if
prcduction peaks and then remains at the 1981 level and the consumption
growth rate is reduced to just one percent, then net exports would end
in 1988. In either case the basic conclusions of this study are unal-
tered.
Therefore, for our projections of WOCA oil supply, we have assumed
for our most likely case that Soviet Bloc oil net exports will gradual-
ly decline and become zero in 1988. For our low supply scenario, we
assume that exports become zero in 1983 and, for our high supply
scenario, 1992.
Communist China
China emerged as a net oil exporter in 1973 just at the time of
the oil embargo and quadrupling of prices. Chinese production was
increasing by 25 percent each year, and there were astonishing fore-
casts of Chinese petroleum reserves. Hopes ran high that China would
soon challenge Saudi Arabia in the world market. But with the passage
of time more sober projections are now being made about China's role as
a major oil exporter.
The production growth rate declined from the high level of the
early seventies to 13 percent for the 1973-78 period, and in 1979
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production increased only 2 percent. Exports have risen only to about
500,000 barrels per day, which would rank China tenth among OPEC na-
tions (ref. 25).
There are some good reasons to expect this slow growth of Chinese
exports to continue in spite of large and growing reserves. Future
export sales will depend on the Chinese resolution of the perceived
trade-off between economic self-sufficiency and the desire to import
modern capital equipment financed through oil revenues (ref. 37).
China aspires to become a major industrial power--not a major
exporter of raw materials. Crude oil exports would escape China with-
out leaving much of a direct impact on the rest of the economy. Their
preference, therefore, is first to use petroleum as an input in the
domestic economy, and second to process crude oil and export petroleum
products.
If China were to decide to increase crude oil exports substantial-
ly, huge outlays for infrastructure would be required. China's har-
bors, for example, are not presently equipped to handle large tankers.
In a capital-scarce economy the opportunity cost of investment in the
oil industry is very high. Thus, a policy of export expansion via
massive investment in the oil industry appears economically unattrac-
tive compared to a policy of moderate investment and restraint on do-
mestic oil consumption.
Moreover, Chinese planners perceive a disruptive nature in a too
rapid introduction of foreign technology. Extensive imports of Western
technology through potential oil revenues could seriously undermine the
fundamental policy of self-reliance. The goal of modernization is
important, but so are the means for its realization. This factor mili-
tates against the emergence of China as a major world oil exporter.
r
	
	 For purposes of this study, we assume that Chinese oil exports
will increase by 5 percent annually for the next 20 years. This will
put China's oil exports at only 1.3 MBOD in the year 2000.
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Synfusl Production
i
Introduction
Synfuels are liquids and gases readily substituted for convention-
al oil products and natural gas in most applications. They can be
derived from oil shale, coal, heavy oil, oil sands, and agricultural
products. Although the synfuel resource base is several times larger
than that for conventional oil and reserves are not presently a limit-
ing factor, there are many barriers which must be overcome, such as
technology, high costs, large investments, and environmental problems.
As these are surmounted, synfuels will make a significant contribution
to energy supplies.
Four countries are expected to produce 90 percent of WOCA's output
of synfuels in the next 20 years: the United States, Canada, Venezuela,
and Brazil (ref. 21). In the U.S. synfuels will come from oil shale,
coal, and to a lesser extent from oil sands. 'anada and Venezuela have
oil sands and heavy oil. Brazil's primary synthetic will be alcohol
from sugar cane.
Technology
Production of synthetic fuels from shale, sands, and coal requires
different technologies which are tailored to the characteristics of the
raw material and the desired product (ref. 24). Compared to conven-
tional oil, these resources have too much mineral content and too
little hydrogen. Mcveral content is of particular concern in shale and
sands because large volumes of solids must be handled in order to
recover relatively small amounts of oil. This requires large amounts
of both capital equipment and manpower.
Oil shale, oil sands, and coal contain less hydrogen than common
fuels such as gasoline; therefore, hydrogen must be chemically added to
these to produce a suitable final product which is interchangeable
with conventional petroleum products. This upgrading is difficult and
expensive, but modern refining technologies can perform this task.
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A great deal of basic research and development work has been com-
pleted for most synthetic resources and processes. For some processes,
a significant number of pilot plants has been built and tested; how-
ever, for most processes commercial-size plants have not yet been
built.
For the United States the most promising synthetic resource in the
near term seems to be oil shale. Shale is relatively abundant, and it
contains a higher percentage of hydrogen than does coal. Modern mining
equipment and methods have been demonstrated satisfactorily in several
small projects. They must be scaled up to commercial operations, but
they do not require major technical innovations.
Much work has been done on the development of techniques to remove
oil from shale once it has been mined, as several pilot plants have
successfully demonstrated. No commercial size plants have yet been
built, but a number of firms appear willing to proceed to commercial-
size plants with technologies which have been tested in large pilot
plants (ref. 38).
Coal can be used to produce either gaseous or liquid fuels, and
commercially proven processes are now available. In addition to these
there are a number of second and third generation processes under de-
velopment. The technology of coal gasification is generally more ad-
vanced than liquification, and commercial-scale coal projects which
have been proposed are almost entirely gasification.
Oil sands and heavy oils vary widely from one deposit to another,
and no single technology is applicable to all. Virtually all of the
ongoing activity in oil sands recovery is taking place in Canada
(ref. 39). Pilot plants have been demonstrated, and several large-
scale commercial projects are soon to begin construction and should be
coming on stream about 1986 and 1987. There has been little interest
shown in U.S. oil sands.
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Costs
The economics of producing synthetic fuels is a subject of consi-
derable debate and confusion. Many studies have been made and many
numbers have been quoted for the costs of plants and the cost to pro-
duce a barrel of product.
Some of the variation is due to different assumptions regarding
equipment specifications, labor costs, interest rates, debt/equity
ratios, and costs of satisfying regulations. Most of the problem, how-
ever, is due to the fact that in most cases complete commercial-size
plants have not yet been built. Cost estimates, therefore, are based
on insufficient data and are subject to a large margin of error.
In 1979 an engineering consulting firm reviewed and evaluated the
studies which had been made. Their conclusions are shown in table 20.
The use of coal to make liquid fuels would seem to be just marginally
profitable at oil prices existing in late 1980. This is no doubt the
reason that so few projects for coal liquification have been announced.
As the price of oil rises relative to the price of coal, more firms
will find investment in coal liquification economically attractive.
Extraction of oil from Canadian sands seem to be quite profitable
at current market prices. Two separate large-scale commercial projects
are presently seeking licenses to proceed. Each plans to produce
140,000 barrels of synthetic-crude oil per day when they are completed
in 6 or 7 years.
Cost estimates for the production of oil from U.S. shale deposits
are the most speculative of the three shown since they are based on
small pilot plants. It would appear, however, that unless unexpected
problems are encountered in scaling up from pilot plants, extraction of
oil from shale can be quite profitable at current world oil prices. A
number of firms appear willing to proceed.
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Table 20. Comparative costs of synthetic fuels (in 1979 prices).
PROCESS SELLING PRICE RELIABILITY BASIS
($/barrels) OF ESTIMATE
Coal liquification 30 - 38 Highest Complete ci	 er-
cial plant built
and operating
Oil sands 26 - 33 High Extensive pilot
plant demonstra-
t ion
Oil shale 22 - 26 Medium Retorts must be
scaled up and
detailed engi-
neering done
Source: ref. 38
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Nonprice Impediments
There are many factors which inhibit the rate of development or
ti?	 size of a synthetic fuels industry. Probably most important is the
body of laws and regulations which apply to synfuel projects. At least
20 different Federal laws can affect synfuel plants, including the
following:
The National Environmental Policy Act
The Clean Air Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Solid Waste Disposal Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Federal Land Policy and Management Act
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
These have the effect of drawing out the time schedule required to
bring a project on line, and create an air of uncertainty which reduces
the willingness to undertake a billion dollar project.
Unfortunately, no synfuel project has yet made it through this
maze of regulations, and so it is impossible to assess the total length
of time required to bring a project on stream. Many commercial pro-
jects which were once active have been scrapped due to uncertainty, law
suits, and regulatory delays. Three coal gasification projects and one
shale oil project begun between 1970 and 1973 have still not received 	
F
final approval. Based on this experience and assuming that all of
these projects are at least three years away from startup, the project
lead cimes will have ranged from 10 to 13 years. The recently enacted
Sythetic Fuels Act has done nothing to reduce these regulatory impedi-
ments.
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Scenario Assumptions
Although there is virtually no synthetic fuel production in the
world today, the technological base for such an industry has been es-
tablished. The world price of crude oil has risen to a level that
makes oil shale and sands economically attractive and liquification of
coal marginal. In the U,S. and Canada the Federal governments have
enacted policies to encourage the development of synthetic fuel produc-
tion.
On the other hand, there are some serious impediments which will
limit the growth rate of this new industry. Judicious management re-
quires that new processes be tested in large-scale pilot plants for
several thousand hours before beginning construction of commercial-size
facilities. Construction and break-in of the commercial plant may
easily take five years. Add the time necessitated by government regu-
latory processes in both the U.S. and Canada and the lead time from R b
D to commercial operation is easily 10 to 15 years.
We conclude that the production of synthetic liquid fuels by 1990
will be quite minimal. On the low side we expect WOCA production to
reach 1.5 MBOD. On the high side, it could hardly surpass 2.5 HBOD.
We have taken production of 2.0 MBOD as our most likely assumption.
Between 1990 and 2000 there is a possibility for more rapid growth
if some of the more significant restraints can be reduced. Our assump-
tion for the most likely level of output in 2000 is 8 PBOD. With esti-
mates on the low side of 6 MBOD and on the high side of 10 MBOD.
Summary
Specific numerical values assumed for each of the three scenarios
for each of the factors affecting the supply of petroleum are summariz-
ed in table 21. In the following section, these figures will be used
in conjunction with the projected demand figures to examine the impli-
cations of the interaction between supply and demand.
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Table 21. Summary of assumptions for projecting the supply of
petroleum.
I
J
SUPPLY
	
SCENARIO
DETERMINANT
LOW SUPPLY	 MEDIUM SUPPLY	 HIGH SUPPLY
Proven Reserves 12-31-78
OPEC 445 bill.	 bbl. 445 bill.	 bbl. 445 bill.	 bbl.
Non-OPEC WOCA 102.5 bill. bbl. 102.5 bill. bbl. 102.5 bill. bbl.
Annual Additions to
Proven Reserves
OPEC 4 g ill.	 bbl. 5 bill.	 bbl. 6 bill.	 bbl.
Non-OPEC WOCA 8 bill. bbl. 10 bill. bbl. 12 bill. bbl.
Production Limits
OPEC 33 MBOD 36 MBOD 39 MBOD
Non-OPEC WOCA R/P Ratio - 15 R/P Ratio - 15 R/P Ratio - 15
Net Imports
Soviet Bloc Zero in 1983 Zero in 1988 Zero in 1992
China Increase 5%/yr Increase 5%/yr Increase 5%/yr
Synfuel Production
1990 1.5 MBOD 2.0 MBOD 2.5 MBOD
2000 6.0 MBOD 8.0 MBOD 10.0 MBOD
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SUPPLY-DEMAND INTERACTION AND PRICE IMPLICATIONS
Historical Review and Interpretation of Crude Oil Prices
1947-1973
From the mid 1950's to the early 1970's the world price of petro-
leum drifted steadily downward. From 1954 to 1970 the real price of
Saudi light crude, deflated by the United States GNP price index, fell
steadily at a rate averaging five percent per year. From 1957 to 1972
the real prices of U.S. produced crude fell 2.1 percent per year (see
fig. 6). During this period proven reserves increased year-by-year,
production expanded rapidly, and WOCA consumption increased by 9.3
percent per year.
This 15-year trend was brought to a dramatic climax in the early
1970's. Crude production in the U.S. peaked in 1970. The petroleum
market tightened, and world crude prices increased sharply in 1971 and
1972. Then in October 1973, in reaction to the Arab-Israeli War came
the famous embargo and quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC nations.
The real price of Saudi light increased 230 percent between 1973 and
1974. Production and consumption rates fell sharply in the next two
years.
These startling events have generally been taken, particularly in
the U.S., as prima facie evidence that OPEC is a cartel acting in typi-
cal fashion exercising its monopoly power. The previous low and fall-
ing price has been assumed to be a proper, competitive price and the
new high price to be an artificial monopoly price. Great attention has
been given to the fact that it costs only 50 cents or so to extract a
barrel of oil in the rich Middle East fields. It has been widely be-
lieved that the cost of extraction should provide a basis for a com-
petitive price.
Under these conditions it was generally believed that the OPEC
"cartel" would soon run into the nemesis of all cartels-- production
quotas. Due to the tremendous, economic, political, and social diver-
sity of the member states, agreement would not be achieved, OPEC would
crumble, and the price of oil would fall back to the competitive level.
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Figure 6. Deflated prices of U.S. and Saudi crude ail, 1948-1980,(1972 = 100).
Sources: Saudi crude, ref. 31
U.S. crude, refs. 40 and 41
GNP deflator: ref. 42
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Quite the contrary has happened, however. OPEC has not crumbled, and
the price of oil has risen even higher. Many have seen this as the
continuing exercise of monopoly power by the OPEC cartel.
The authors do not accept this popular interpretation of events
due to one major fact which is inconsistent with the cartel theory.
The essence of a cartel is twofold. First, the members must agree to
raise the product price .above the level that would be determined in the
marketplace if each firm acted individually to achieve its own self-
interest. Secondly, this higher price necessarily implies that less
product can be sold by all firms combined. Row much less, of course,
depends on the nature of the commodity, but in all cases it will be
less. KKowever, the higher price generally means that it is in the
interest of each individual producer to expand output. If they do, the
cartel will disintegrate. Therefore, the cartel must establish produc-
tion quotas or require side payments from one producer to another.
OPEC has never been able to establish production quotas even
though they attempted to do so as far back as the early 1960's.
Venezuela, then the largest producer, wanted to use historical output
as the base for quotas. Iran argued for national population. Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait selected proven reserves. Agreement could not be
reached and attempts to establish production quotas were abandoned
(ref. 43).
A far more satisfactory thesis has recently been offered by Johany
(ref. 44), who argued that both the Falling price of the sixties and
the increasing price of the seventies were due to changes in property
rights in OPEC oil fields. Prior to World War II the Latin American
and Middle East countries granted some of the major oil companies
{	 rights to search for and produce oil. The original concessions gave
the producing nations a certain royalty per unit of output and granted
the companies the right of ownership of crude oil deposits. Most of
these original concessions would have expired by the 1990's.
These agreements were repeatedly renegotiated. Each successive
agreement resulted in more favorable terms for the countries and ie 4s
favorable terms for the companies. All the while there was an increas-
ing threat of nationalization.
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The significance of these developments was not lost on the oil
company executives. Oil sold today at whatever price is worth more
than oil left in the ground to be handed over to someone else. They
were, of course, aware that increasing output depresses prices, but no
company acting alone could raise prices by restricting output. In the 	 f
absence of collusion, self-interest dictated that each country increase
ouput as rapidly as possible. As a result, the price of petroleum fell
steadily.	 j
In October 1973 the producing nations decided to determine the
price of their oil unilaterally rather then through negotiations with
the oil companies as had been done in the past. Once the host coun-
tries became the ones to choose how such to produce and how such to
charge, the companies became more production and marketing agencies
rather than owners of crude de posits. This amounted to a de facto
nationalization of crude oil deposits.
For the producing countries, ownership rights of the deposits were
certain and secure. Oil in the ground then became an alternative in-
vestment in competition with real capital investment and financial
assets that might be purchased with oil revenues. Under safe and se-
cure property rights, oil in the ground is to be preferred if one ex-
pects its price to rise faster than the rate of return on real capital
or the rate of interest on financial assets.
In most of the oil exporting countries, the rate of return on real
domestic investment has been driven to a very low level. The rate of
interest on financial assets must be discounted by the likelihood of
currency depreciation and expropriation. As a result, discount rates
for the producing countries are substantially lower than for the oil
companies. It is therefore sensible for each country to reduce output
below the rate determined by the oil compattiRs. lio collusion or coer-
cion is requires! for this reduction to take place. Each country acting
independently in its own self-interest would reduce output (or output
growth rates) below that prevailing prior to 1973.
Although OPEC is not strictly a cartel, there is at least one way
that OPEC does significantly affect the price of oil, i.e., by reducing
r—
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uncertainty. One of the standard characteristics of any oligopolistic
market like oil is interdependency. An action by one firm, such as
increasing price, will bring forth a reaction by others, but one can
never be certain what that reaction will be. OPEC provides a forum for
discussion of possible actions and reactions before the event,. Uncer-
tainty is thereby substantially reduced, although not completely elimi-
nated. As a result, price changes are now more abrupt than before. No
nation acting alone could have quadrupled its price in one mow, but
all of them acting jointly could do so.
1974-1980
In 1974-75, the United States and most of the industrialised world
sank into the most severe recession since that of 1937-38. As a result
of reduced production lev ,!ls, the demand for petroleum fell sharply,
and there suddenly developed a glut in the world petroleum market-- in
spite of the OPEC countries' reduced desires to supply crude oil.
Under these conditions the OPEC nations were unable to increase
the price of crude any faster than the general rate of inflation in the
United States. The deflated price of Saudi light remained roughly
stable through 1978.
Beginning in 1977 the world petroleum market ran through a classi-
cal inventory-speculative cycle that practically doubled the real price
of crude oil is 1979-80. In 1977 the oil companies added to their in-
ventories at a fairly substantial rate, partially in anticipation of
further price increases. Then in 1978, when the market softened and
price increases failed to keep pace with general inflation, they re-
versed policy and reduced inventories by the largest amount within the
past decade. This left them with relatively low inventories at the
outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in late 1978. Iranian production
fell rapidly from six to one-half million barrels per day.	
i
At this point fear became the only relevant factor in t it►e world
petroleum market. Other producers responded quickly and increased
f	 production. Prom 1978 to 1979 as a whole, production increased in
WOCA, in OPEC, and even in the Middle East (including Iran) (ref. 45).
i
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This fact, however, only served to mitigate developments that were
dominated by fear of a shortage and fear of further price increases.
Oil companies began to scramble for oil supplies to build up in-
ventories. Spot market prices were bid up substantially above the
official OPEC price level (ref. 46). The spot market is a very thin
market, and the price is, therefore, very sensitive to sharp changes in
either supply or demand.
Some of the most militant OPEC producers were very quick to follow
the spot market by increasing the price of their oil. A few producers,
led by Saudi Arabia, were more reluctant to see the price rise and de-
layed increasing their price. This resulted in a two-tier price market
with a substantial disparity among OPEC producers selling the same
grade of oil. Eventually Saudi Arabia raised their price to reduce the
disparity and the price hawks immediately raised their price again.
Prices leapfrogged in this way through 1979 and much of 1980.
Each price increase further aggravated the expectation that prices
would continue to rise, which further increased the oil companies' de-
sire to build up inventories before the next price increase. Such a
speculative bubble can only come to an end when the companies have man-
aged to increase inventories to a level that they deem satisfactory
given their expectations of sales and price increases. This one sub-
sided in the middle of 1980 and prices began to stabilize.
Petroleum Price Projections
Summary of Demand and Supply Projections
The extent to which the OPEC countries are able to increase the
price of petroleum over the coming years will depend on the market
conditions of demand, non-OPEC supply, and their own willingness to
restrict production. Each of these factors has been discussed in de-
tail in earlier portions of this report. The separate demand and
supply projections will now be brought together and examined for price
implications.
For each factor affecting supply or demand, three assumptions have
been made: a value that the authors feel to be the most likely to occur
and high and lour	 !ies that are considered possible but not probable.
On this basis, Ln.ue demand projections and three supply projections
are made. These could logically be combined to construct nine scenar-
ios; however, only three are presented here. First, there is the mid-
level scenario which combines the supply and demand projections deemed
most likely to occur. Next, the low demand projection is combined with
low supply. The reason for this is that the slower growth of demand
would result in a lower price, which in turn is consistent with a slow-
er growth of supply. Finally, high demand is combined with high sup-
ply. The greater demand would result in a higher price which would be
consistent with a higher level of supply.
These projections are presented in tables 22, 23 and 24. The
numbers in columns two and three are constructed as previously explain-
ed. OPEC production, in column four, is computed as a residual by
subtracting non-OPEC supply from WOCA demand. This is based on the
hypothesis that consumers first obtain oil from non-OPEC producers and
that OPEC is residual supplier. Column five shows any potential short-
fall as a discrepancy between demand and total supply.
Potential Shortfalls
The likelihood of a potential shortfall occurring within the next
20 years appears to be possible but highly unlikely. In our mid-level,
most likely scenario, OPEC production only gets as high as 31.7 MBOD.
This is well below even the lowest OPEC production limit of 33 MBOD
which is considered likely. In the low demand-low supply scenario,
OPEC production is continually lower than the 1979 level of production.
Only in the high demand-high supply scenario at the end of the 20 years
is there a potential shortfall, when the demand for OPEC oil reaches
39.5 MBOD.
In the event that such a potential shortfall should occur, we
'	 would expect events to follow closely what happened in 1979-80. There
would be a scramble among oil companies to obtain sufficient supplies
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Table 22: Projected WOCA demand and supply for petrol
based on midlevel scenario (in million bars
of oil per day).
NON-OPEC	 OPEC
	 POTEWTtAL
YEAR	 DEMAND	 SUPPLY	 PRODUCTION	 SHORTFALL
1980 51.0 21.3 29.7	 --
1981 51.3 21.7 29.6	 --
1982 51.5 22.2 29.3	 --
1983 51.8 22.5 29.3	 --
1984 52.1 22.9 29.2	 --
1985 52.3 23.3 29.0	 --
1986 52.7 23.7 29.0	 --
1987 52.8 24.1 28.7	 --
1988 53.1 24.7 28.4	 --
1989 53.3 25.4 27.9	 --
1990 53.6 26.3 27.3	 --
1991 54.7 26.8 27.9	 --
1992 55.8 27.4 28.4	 --	 t
1993 57.0 28.1 28.9	 --
1994 58.2 28.8 29.4	 --
1995 59.4 29.6 29.8	 --
1996 60.6 30.5 30.1	 ---
1997 61.9 31.4 30.5	 --	 1
1998 63.2 32.5 30.7	 --
1999 64.5 33.2 31.3	 --
2000 65.8 34.8 31.0	 --
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Table 23: Projected WOCA demand and supply for petroleum
based on low demand-low supply scenario (in
million barrels of oil per day)
NON-OPEC	 OPEC
	 POTENTIAL
YEAR	 DEMAND
	 SUPPLY	 PRODUCTION	 SHORTFALL
1980 50.3 20.7 29.6	 --
1981 49.9 20.6 29.3
	 --
1982 49.4 20.6 28.8
	 --
1983 49.0 20.4 28.6
	 --
1984 48.5 20.6 27.9
	 --
1985 48.1 21.0 27.1
	 --
1986 47.6 21.2 26.4	 --
1987 47.2 21.5 25.7	 --
1988 46.8 22.0. 24.8	 --
1989 46.3 22.3 24.0
	 --
1990 45.9 22.9 23.0	 --
1991 46.6 23.2 23.4	 --
1992 47.2 23.6 23.6	 --
1993 47.9 24.0 23.9
	 --
1994 48.6 24.4 24.2	 --
1995 49.3 25.0 24.3	 --
1996 50.0 25.6 24.4	 --
1997 50.7 26.2 24.5
	 --
1998 51.4 26.9 24.5
	 --
1999 52.2 27.6 24.6
	 --
2000 52.9 28.6 24.3	 --
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Table 24: Projected WOCA demand and supply for petroleum
based on high demand-high supply scenario (in
million barrels of oil per day)
i
NOW OPEC OPEC	 POTENTIAL
YEAR DEMAND SUPPLY PRODUCTION	 SHORTFALL
i
1980 51.6 21.7 29.9	 --
1981 52.5 22.4 30.1	 --
1982 53.3 23.4 29.9	 --
1983 54.2 24.1 30.2	 --
1984 55.0 24.9 30.1	 --
1985 55.9 25.6 30.3	 --
1986 56.9 26.2 30.7	 --
1987 57.8 27.0 30.8	 --	 1
1988 58.7 27.8 30.9	 --
1989 59.6 28.7 30.9	 --
1990 60.6 29.9 30.7	 --
1991 62.3 30.7 31.6	 --
1992 64.1 31.3 32.8	 --
1993 65.9 32.5 33.4	 --
1994 67.8 33.3 34.5	 --
1995 69.7 34.3 35.4	 --•
1996 71.6 35.3 36.3	 --
1997 73.7 36.6 37.1	 --
1998 75.8 37.9 37.9	 --
1999 77.9 39.3 38.6	 --
2000 80.1 41.0 39.1	 0.1
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in anticipation of the shortage. Ibis would rapidly bid the price up
as happened in 1979. It is impossible to anticipate just how high the
price would go due to the crucial importance of the psychological fac-
tor in such an event. It is certainly reasonable to expect the price
to double, and not surprising if it might triple before demand is re-
duced sufficiently to clear the market.
Price Projections for 1990
The more problematical analysis regards the price implications of
the projections in the absence of a shortfall. The authors have dis-
covered no objective technique to determine the pricing implications
other than the exercise of informed judgment.
In our midlevel, most likely scenario, WOCA demand for petroleum
increases from 51 MBOD in 1980 to 53.6 MBOD in 1990. However, non-OPEC
supply increases at such a rate that the residual demand for OPEC oil
actually falls over the decade from 29.7 to 27.3 MBOD. This decline in
the demand for OPEC oil might tempt some to say that the price might
fall or, at least, not rise. We believe that this is not the case,
although the declining demand will certainly make it more d:.fficult for
OPEC to raise the price of oil.
Some further data on the forces impinging on the pricing decision
are presented in table 25. Under our midlevel scenario assumptions,
WOCA's proven reserves will fall from 545 billion barrels in 1980 to
507 billion barrels in 1990. Within OPEC the decline is even more
dramatic--from 439 to 378 billion barrels.
Reserve-to-production ratios will also be falling, especially in
OPEC. In spite of the decline in OPEC production, the aggregate R/P
ratio for all of OPEC will fall from 40.5 to 38. This is perhaps not
dramatic, but it is certainly a significant drop for a decade and con-
trary to all prior experience.
Synthetic petroleum production is another matter that must be
considered when the OPEC countries price their oil. One strategy that
could be followed by OPEC and the other oil producers would be to
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Table 25. Midlevel scenario of conventional petroleum production, additions
to reserves, and reserves for WOCA and OPEC in 1980, 1990, and
2000 (in billions of barrels).
BEGINNING	 GROSS	 ENDING BEGINNING ENDING
AREA PERIOD RESERVES PRODUCTION ADDITIONS RESERVE R/P RATIO R/P RATIO
	
WOCA 1980-1990 545 	 203	 165	 507	 30.5	 27.5
	
WOCA 1991-2000 507	 200	 150	 457	 27.5	 22
OPEC 1980-1990 439 116 55 378 40.5 38
OPEC 1991-2000 378 110 50 318 38 27.5
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increase production as necessary to keep the price of oil low enough to
prevent entry of synthetic oil producers. The OPEC countries have
r
	 already shown that they are not willing to do this. Therefore, we
project that synfuel productions will gradually increase and be 2 MBOD
p'	
in 1990 or about 3.7 percent of WOCA oil consumption.
Constituting such a small share of the market, synfuel producers
would be price takers and accept the market price determined by canven-
tional oil. The output of synfuel would merely be one addition to the
WOCA supply of'oil, which together with demand determines price.
Consideration of these factors leads to the conclusion that the
price of petroleum will rise over the decade, though at a fairly moder-
ate rate in comparison to the 1970's. An annual real price increase on
the order of four percent would seem reasonably consistent with both
the supply and demand conditions contained in our midlevel scenario.
This would raise the price of petroleum from an approximate $35 per
barrel in 1980 to about $52 per barrel in 1990.
In our low demand-low supply scenario, WOCA demand declines from
50.3 MBOD to 45.9 MBOD in 1990. The residual demand for OPEC oil falls
from 29.6 to 23.0 MBOD--a decline of 22 percent. Such a decline in
demand would put substantially greater strain on the OPEC organization.
Reaching agreement on cutbacks in production would be more difficult
than in the midlevel scenario case.
As a result the increase in price would be less--perhaps in the
area of two percent per year increase in the real price. This would
bring the price of petroleum to about $43 per barrel in 1990.
In our high demand-high supply scenario, WOCA demand increases
from 51.6 MBOD to 60.6 MBOD in 1990. Non-OPEC supply increases sub-
stantially, and the residual demand for OPEC oil increases moderately
from 29.9 MBOD to 30.7 MBOD. Such conditions would permit a more rapid
in-crease in price in the nature of six percent per year. This would
raise the price to $63 per barrel in 1990.
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Price Projections for 2000
In all three scenarios WOCA's demand for oil increases more rap-
idly in the decade of the 90's than in the decade of the 80's. The
reason for this is that the process of conversion to other fuels in the
electric utility, residential-commercial, and manufacturing sectors
will be substantially completed within a decade. After that, the de-
mand for petroleum will more closely follow the level of aggregate
production and increase with GNP.
In all three scenarios the residual demand for OPEC oil increases
in the decade of the 90's, whereas it fell during the 80's in two of
the scenarios. As a result, we can expect the price of oil to increase
more rapidly during the 90's in each scenario. Table 26 summarizes the
changes in WOCA demand and OPEC production over each of the coming two
decades.
In the midlevel, most likely scenario, WOCA demand increases from
53.6 MBOD in 1990 to 65.8 MBOD in 2000. The demand facing OPEC in-
creases from 27.3 to 31.0 MBOD. Although this is only slightly above
their production level in 1990, it is nevertheless an increase of 3.7
MBOD over the decade. Considering the fact that by that time some OPEC
countries will have passed their peak production and be on the decline,
this is a substantial increase in production.
Synfuel will be substantially more significant in the market by
this time, and production of synfuel is projected to hit eight MBOD by
the year 2000. This figure has been subtracted from WOCA demand to
calculate the demand for OPEC oil. Even in the year 2000 the output of
synfuel will not be great enough to limit the price of petroleum to the
cost of producing synthetic petroleum.
Proven reserves of convential oil will fall frovi 507 billion
barrels at the beginning of the decade to 457 billion at the end. The
R/P ratio for all of WOCA will fall from 27.5 to 22. Within OPEC
proven reserves will decline from 378 to 318 billion barrels. The R/P
ratio will fall from 38 to 27.5.
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Table 26. Suemary of cheap@ in NOCA demand and
OPEC production: 19WIPO0 and 1990-2000
(in million barrels per day).
PERIOD	 VOCA DEMAND	 OPEC PRODUCTION
Midlevel Scenario
	
1980-1990	 + 2.6	 - 2.4
	
1990-2000
	 +12.2	 + 3.7
Low Demand- Loa Supply Scenario
	
1980-1990	 - 4.4
	 - 6.2
	
1990-2000	 + 7.0
	 + 1.3
High Demand-High Supply Scenario
	
1980-1990	 + 9.0
	
+ 0.8
	
1990-2000
	 +19.5	 + 8.4
Calculated from tables 22, 23, and 24.
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Thess conditions will put greater pressure on raisins the price of
oil in the 90's than in any of the three scenarios for the GO's. In
the midlevel scenario the price of crude should increase by an average
of at least seven percent per year. This would raise the price from
$52 in 1990 to $102 in 2000.
In the low demand-law supply scenario, WOCA's demand increases
from 45.9 to 52.9 MBOD. After subtracting non-OPEC supply, the demand
facing OPEC rises from 23.0 to 24.3 MBOD. This is an increase over the
decade of 1.3 MBOD, compared to 3.7 in the midlevel scenario. Thus,
market conditions are only slightly less expansive than in the midlevel
scenario. As a result the price of oil should increase by about 6
percent annually from $43 to $77 a barrel.
In the high demand-high supply scenario, WOCA demand increases
from 60.6 to 80.1 NBOD over the decade, and the demand facing OPEC
rises rapidly from 30.7 to 39.1 MBOD. This would require an increase
in OPEC production of 27 percent over the decade. Such pressure would
increase the price at a rate of at least 10 percent per year. This
would increase the price of oil from $63 a barrel in 1990 to $150 in
1999 just before the point that a potential shortfall is projected.
All of these price protections are summarized in table 27.
Historical Review and Interpretation of Jet Fuel Prices
Figure 7 shows the real price of kerosene products, including jet
fuel, in the United States (deflated by the GNP price deflator) for the
period 1948-1980. Also sham are the deflated prices of U.S. crude and
Saudi crude. All prices are indexes with 1972 equal to 100.
Examination of these graphs indicates that the price of kerosene
products follows the price of crude quite closely. From 1948 to 1972
the price of kerosene products tracks the price of domestic crude more
closely than it does the price of Saudi. This is consistent with theo-
retial expectation. The relevant cost for price determination is mar-
ginal cost. During this period the price of Saudi crude was less than
the price of domestic crude. During much of the period the United
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Table 27. Crude petrolem real-price projections for
1990 and 2000 (in 1980 dollar@ per barrel).
LOW DEMAND -
	
NIGH DEMAND -
LOW SUPPLY
	
MIDLEVEL
	
HIGH SUPPLY
YEAR
	
SCENARIO
	
SCENARIO
	
SCENARIO
1980
	 $ 35	 $ 35
	 $ 35
1990
	 $ 43	 $ 52	 $ 63
2000	 $ 77	 $102	 $1509
a projected price for 1999 immediately preceding a
projected shortfall
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Figure 7. Deflated prices of U.S. crude, Saudi crude, and U.S.
kerosene products, 1948-1980 (1972 - 100).
Sources: Saudi crude, U.S. crude. and GNP deflator, fig. 6
Kerosene, refs. 40 and 41
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States restricted imports of crude oil in order to support the domestic
price. Therefore, the marginal cost of crude to the refiner was the
higher priced domestic crude.
In the 1970's, conditions changed dramatically. Domestic produc-
tion oesked and began to fall, the United States became a net importer,
M4s world price of oil increased dramatically, and the United States
imposed price controls on domestic crude and refined products. Under
these changed conditions the marginal cost of crude became the world
price of imported oil. Theory would lead us to expect that the price
of refined products should then follow the world price of oil rather
than the domestic price.
Examination of the graph indicates that, indeed, this is what hap-
pened, although not so closely as in the earlier period. Beginning
with the increase in the price of Saudi crude in 1973, before the quad-
rupling and embargo, the price of kerosene products began to track the
price of Saudi crude more closely than the lower priced domestic crude.
These observations are crucial to a proper interpretation of these
events. First, the price of kerosene products increased substantially
less than the price of Saudi crude from 1972 to 1978.. Second, the
price of crude leveled off in the 1974 . 78 period, while the price of
kerosene products continued to increase by decreasing amounts. Third,
in 1979-80, the price of kerosene products increased in line with the
price of Saudi crude.
We conclude that 1972-78 was a distinct and unique period in the
relationship between the price of crude and the price of kerosene prod-
ucts, including jet fuel. This may have been due to the price controls
which were imposed in late 1971 and removed on jet fuel in February
1979. There is some doubt concerning this explanation because many
refiners had unrecouped costs and legal authority to raise the price of
refined products above the actual level (ref. 45).
Mother explanation is that the combination of quadrupling of the
price of crude and the ensuing recession was so dramatic and unprece-
dented an event that it took the industry four years to return to some-
thing of an equilbrium. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the
i
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period from 1972-78 was unique and does not provide a proper basis to
project into the future.
In 1979-80 with price controls removed from jet fuel and having
recently experienced a dramatic price increase, the price of kerosene
products closely followed the increase in Saudi crude.
To summarize, the price of kerosene products closely followed the
price of U.S. crude prior to 1972 and Saudi crude after 1972, with a
disruption of the relationship between 1972 and 1978.
Econometric Analysis
To measure more precisely the relationship discussed in the previ-
ous section between the price of crude and the price of jet fuel, an
econometric analysis was performed. The dependent variable in the
regressions is:
DEKERO - Index of wholesale price of the kerosene product group
excluding taxes and deflated by the U.S. GNP price defla-
tor (1972 - 100) .
The principal independent variable is:
DEMCCRUD - Deflated marginal cost of crude oil. This variable is
constructed by splicing the price of domestic crude for
1948-72 and the price of Saudi crude for 1972-80. It is
an index with 1972 - 100.
Additional independent variables are:
DUMMY - A dummy variable to capture the disturbance in relation-
ship between DEKERO and DEMCCRUD previously discussed.
It is equal to zero for 1948-71 and 79-80 and for projec-
ting into the future. For 1972-78 it is equal to
DEMCCRUD.
OPRATIO - Operating ratio or the percentage of refinery capacity
	 I
being utilized; and
	
1
i
KEROSKRE - Kerosene product group share (X) of the total market for
petroleum products.
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All data are annual figures for the period 1948-1980. Price of
U.S. crude, refinery operating ratio, quantity of kerosene products
produced, and total petroleum products produced are from references 40
and 41. Price of Saudi crude is from reference 31. GNP deflator is
from reference 42.
As a first approximation, DERERO is regressed on DEMCCRUD alone.
The relationship is given in table 28 in both linear and natural logar-
ithmic forms. Numbers in parentheses are t values for the coefficients
of the variables. Coefficients of determination and Durbin-Watson
statistics are also shown.
Coefficients of determination for both equations (1) and (2) are
above 0.9 and are highly statistically significant. In both equations
the coefficient of DEMCCRUD is statistically significant at a very high
level and confirms the visual observation of a close correlation be-
tween the two variables. The low value of the Durbin-Watson statistic
indicates the presence of the statistical problem of autocorrelation,
which tends to bias the coefficients of the variables. Squation (3)
shows the regression results when the remaining subsidiary independent
variables are included in the regession. The R  is increased by a
significant amount. Coefficients of all the variables are statistic-
ally significant at the five percent level or better. The Durbin-
Watson statistic indicates that the equation is reasonably free of the
problem of autocorrelation. In short, this equation shows highly re-
spectable statistical properties. On this basis it is acceptable for
projecting the price of jet fuel.
Jet Fuel Price Projections
The regression results form the previous section provide the
essential basis for projecting t s price of jet fuel for the years 1990
and 2000.. For the projections, the refinery operating ratio is set
equal to the average value for the 1948-80 period. The kerosene prod-
uct share of the market is set equal to its 1980 value. Prices of
crude oil are those previously projected and reported in table 27.
I
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Table 28. Regression results with DeKero as the dependent variable.
COEFFICIENTS ON
EQUATION	 ADJUITED
NUMBER DEMCCRUD DU MY 01PRATIO KSROSBRE INTERCEPT 	 R	 D.W. FORM
(1) 0.40	 0.71	 0.92 0.5	 Linear
(19.4)a
(2) 0.55	 0.22	 0.91 0.5	 Log
(18.1)
(3) 0.48 -0.13	 0.80 -367.2	 18.5	 0.98 2.1	 Linear
(33.1) (-9.8) (1.6)	 (-2.7)
a Numbers in parentheses are t values.
f
106
With these inputs, the price index for the kerosene product group
is calculated. The percentage increases thus determined are then
applied to the 1980 price of jet fuel to calculate projected prices of
jet fuel for 1990 and 2000 for each of our three scenarios. 7hese
projections are shown in table 29.
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Table 29. Projected price of jet fuel in the United States
in 1980 prices (dollars per gallon).
SCENARIO
LOW DEMAND- MIDLEVEL HIGH DEMAND-
YEAR LOW SUPPLY HIGH SUPPLY
1980a $ 0.92 $ 0.92 $ 0.92
1990 $	 1.11 $ 1.32 $	 1.57
2000 $ 1.89 $ 2.46 $ 3.56b
aref. 45
bEstimate for 1999 preceding a projected shortfall in
2000.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The doubling of the price of patrols= following the Iranian
Revolution initiated a set of responses that will revolutionise the
petroleum market over the next 20 years. Principle among these is the
substitution of other fuels (especially coal and natural gas) for
petroleum. This process of interfuel substitution cannot be accom-
plished in short order but will require a considerable period of time.
We hypothesize that the full adjustment will take some 20 years, but
most conversion will occur during the 1980 ' s. After that, the demand
for petroleum will more closely follow the growth of total world pro-
duction of goods and services.
From this analysis, it follows that during the 1980's the demand
for petroleum will increase slowly or decline, depending on the exact
rate of conversion and the rate of economic growth. The conversion
process being discussed should not be construed as the sole cause of
the soft market in the winter of 1982. The current low level of demand
is due primarily to the general economic contraction throughout most of
the industrialized world. With the economic expansion which is expect-
ed over the next few years, the demand for petroleum should increase
back to the trend level projected, while the conversion process con-
tinues.
With the major portion of the conversion process completed, the
demand for petroleum will increase more rapidly during the 1990's.
This conclusion holds regardless of which demand scenario comes to
pass.
On the supply side of the petroleum market, the recent price
increase will stimulate supply through new discoveries and improved
t
^	 recovery techniques. Gradually at first, then gaining momentum in the
f	 1990 ' s, there will be an increasing supply of synthetic fuels-- particu-
t	
larly from oil sands and shale.
i
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With these rather favorable and optimistic developments on both
sides of the market, the price of petroleum should rise somewhat slowly
through the 1980'x. However, with the tightening of the market in the
nineties, the price can be expected to rise at a significantly higher
rate.
Note that all of this assumes a relative tranquility and political
stability in the Middle Bast. Obviously, this is a rather shaky
assumption to make for a 20-year projection.
Based on these conclusions, we recommend that the government take
the following actions:
1. The government should pursue various techniques to stimulate
research and development in additional ways to conserve in the use of
petroleum without reducing the standard of living. Much of this R&D
can and should be performed by the private sector; however, R&D can be
expected to yield external benefits that accrue to society at large.
This portion should properly be performed by government.
By its very nature k&D involves extensive lead times--measured in
decades--before it comes to fruition in the marketplace. Therefore
research today must be looking to the needs of the mid-nineties and
beyond.
2. The government should pursue varios policies to stimulate the
establishment of a sound, viable, synthetic fuel industry--particularly
shale oil. The principle economic incentive, the price of petroleum,
seems to be in place. The main impediment appears to be the maze of
governmental authorities that must grant permission before projects can
go forward. The entire process for reviewing projects should be thor-
oughly examined and streamlined so that projects can be either approved
or rejected in such less time than is now required.
3. Some difficult decisions must be made concerning how such
environmental pollution is to be permitted. Zero pollution is simply
not the answer if we are to continue to raise the average standard of
living. Consequently, some rational trade-off must be made between
environmental pollution and energy production.
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